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"Is British Government better described as 'Prime Ministerial Government' or 'Cabinet Government'?"

 

By Mr Jean-Paul LAWRENCE TAMPU-EYA, BA LL.B. LL.M. PhD (Law Res.)

Many scholars[1] and political analysts seem to argue that compared to the Cabinet, the power of the Prime Minister has really increased. Consequently, the Premier is no longer seen as the 'first among equals' since he dominates the political executive. As a result, it is no longer the Cabinet but Prime Ministerial government that is in power. The Cabinet that was seen once as the 'efficient secret of the government' because it used to be active in making decisions has changed to become the dignified part of the government since all effective power is now concentrated in the hands of one man who is the PM. 

In answering whether British government can be better described as 'Prime Ministerial' or 'Cabinet government', this essay is structured as follows: after this introduction, it argues, firstly, that UK's unwritten constitution without clear cut separation of power is the main cause of giving the Prime Minister too much power. Secondly, it describes the Cabinet Government as the form of collective executive government, which from the doctrine of collective responsibility plays a major role in constraining the power of the Prime Minister. Thirdly, it argues that the office of the Prime Minister is now so powerful that it forms the political executive since it is the efficient secretive part of government where most executive decisions are made while the Cabinet has become merely a dignified part giving such decisions some legitimacy. Thirdly, the work looks at the origin of the office of the Prime Minister. After analysing the power of the PM vis-à-vis his Cabinet, it argues, therefore, that the Premier is too powerful. Fourthly, it opines that since no one elects directly the PM but he is in power because he leads the majority in Parliament; therefore, he cannot pass dangerous policies since his power depends on the support he gets from the Cabinet and especially the party. Fifthly, it emphasises that the British government still swings between Prime Ministerial and Cabinet government since strong Premiers come and go. Sixthly, it introduces the concept of 'core executive', as an alternative to the solution of this debate that is still going on. Seventhly, it suggests that the whole of UK political and constitutional systems need to be reformed because they seem to give too much power in one man's hands. Lastly, it concludes that the British government still swings between Prime Ministerial and Cabinet government since autocratic Prime Ministers come and weaker ones usually replace them.

Unlike the US, which has a written constitution in which major political institutions and power derive, the UK lacks a codified constitution. Therefore, the executive, i.e. PM and his Cabinet has too much power, which derives mainly from the major unwritten constitutional sources including Conventions, Parliamentary sovereignty, delegated legislation and the Royal prerogatives.[2] In addition, the UK does not have a clear system of separation of powers and this does not help to avoid tyranny[3]. Unlike Montesquieu[4] views, the three political institutions in which power has to be separated are fused in Britain. Firstly, the members of the Executive who are the PM and his Cabinet are also members of Parliament. Secondly, the Premier is the leader of majority party in Parliament; and, consequently, this majority combined with the doctrine of Parliamentary sovereignty make him and his Cabinet much too powerful; and, therefore, they dominate Parliament. Lastly, in the Judiciary, most senior judges are appointed with the advice of the PM and they seat in the House of Lords both in its Judicial and its parliamentary capacities. The Lord Chancellor is appointed by the Crown on the Prime Minister's advice; and, he is at the same time a Cabinet minister, head of the Judiciary and presides over the House of Lords, which all make him to 'walk and talk contradictory'.[5] Therefore, a clear cut answer on whether UK has a Prime Ministerial or Cabinet government will remain difficult to give as long as the UK neither has a written constitution nor a clear separation of power.

As Ian Budge[6] asserts, Britain still seems to have a Cabinet government because UK Premiers are usually seen to be formidable only in the short run; since, in the long run, they become more dependent upon their Party and the Cabinet, where important policies will be agreed. The Cabinet, which is a committee of ministers with both executive and political functions can trace its origin back to the Middle ages and the Privy Council, a group of people chosen by the monarch to advise him on affairs of the state. The Cabinet freed itself from the monarch in the eighteen century; and, after 1832, it became increasingly the reflection of the preferences done in elections and the mood of the House of Commons. Its work became more organised since 1916, when Lloyd George's created the post of Cabinet Secretariat. Lord Hailsham[7] rightly explains that Parliamentary supremacy became in fact vested in the majority party and its leadership who are mainly the Cabinet. As Cabinet power rests upon the House of Commons' majority support, it has to reflect the Commons' political complexion and this therefore represents another constrain on the PM who is accountable to the House of Commons in Wednesday's Question Times. Therefore, the Cabinet seems to be the most powerful group of politicians that is formed by the majority party in Parliament and it represents a constraint against the Prime Minister since his political power appears to be limited because he needs a Cabinet to form a legitimate collective political executive. The two outstanding constitutional doctrines of ministerial responsibility and collective responsibility make the Cabinet to be the heart of the British executive machinery.[8] 

The Cabinet plays a major role in UK politics. It meets on Thursday at Downing Street No. 10 where Cabinet ministers with the PM have discussions on topical issues such as foreign policy and Parliamentary reports. There are no vote in the Cabinet but it is the Premier who sums up the Cabinet meeting and any decision taken becomes formal for civil servants to act upon it. Moreover, no minister will be allowed to criticise the Cabinet decision under the doctrine of collective responsibility since doing so will constrain the minister into resignation. However, the majority of Cabinet works are done in the Cabinet Committees whose heads are chosen by the PM to whom all of them have to report. By representing an oversight of the executive, the Cabinet provides a leadership for the UK and its Parliament; and, Jack Cunningham's new job of Cabinet enforcer shows that it helps to enforce the executive machinery.[9]         

While John Mackintosh[10] and Richard Crossman[11] claim that the cabinet government has been in demise since UK Premier has become too powerful and that, the 'Prime Minister's Office'[12] has almost become similar to that of a president.[13] They say that Premiers come to dominate the Cabinet because of their power to hire and fire ministers, their control over Cabinet structures, agenda meetings and their dispensation of patronage. Both the growth of civil services and the growth of modern, disciplined, mass political parties in the 20th century represent the substantial development that increased the power of the PM. To this Crossman adds, prime ministerial domination of the government publicity machine as a vital weapon in the supremacy of the PM over the Cabinet.[14] He concludes that it will be misleading to say that the Britain has a Cabinet government. He says:

"…Now the country is governed by the Prime Minister who leads, co-ordinates and maintains a series of ministers all of whom are advised and backed by civil servants…The post-war epoch…has seen the final transformation of Cabinet government into Prime Ministerial government. Under this system the 'hyphen which joins, the buckle which fastens, the legislative part of the state to the executive part' becomes one man"[15]

In this view, British government is better described as a Prime Ministerial government' since the PM and his close personal allies and friends are the only people who make most important decisions.[16] The real centres of power are the key Cabinet Committees whose heads are appointed by the PM and 'kitchen cabinet'[17] that are all under the control of the Premier while the real Cabinet, which may not even be consulted usually acts simply as a rubber stamp.[18] There are now about 100 cabinet committees that cover almost all spheres of life. The PM decides the political agenda of these committees and he appoints their chairmen whose tasks would be to report to him who will take the final decision.[19] Peter Hennessy[20] states that the 'Big Four' constituting of Gordon Brown, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the Foreign Secretary Robin Cook, John Prescott at the Environment and Transport and the Lord Chancellor Derry Irvine do many things in Tony Blair government that the Cabinet is unaware of. He confirms that:

"…the 'Big Four'… were…in the Cabinet ministerial loop which knew in advance that interest rates were to move from Great George Street to Threadneedle Street."[21]    

Dennis Kavanagh[22] describes the UK Prime Minister as the head of the executive and government policy, leader of the party of majority in Parliament, head appointing officer and senior UK representative abroad. The office of the PM was born as a result of an accident of history. Initially, the King used to preside over the executive until 1714 after Queen Anne died without leaving an heir. Therefore, George I, elector of Hanover, was imported from the continent and since he was not really interested in politics and could not speak English, the task of chairing the Cabinet that was traditionally the monarch's job fell to the First Lord of the Treasury. Under Sir Robert Walpole, who is seen as the first Prime Minister, this role of chairing the Cabinet became much more developed. Consequently, the office of the Prime Minister that is at the heart of UK politics emerged as a matter of history and convention.[23] Since the UK does not have a written constitution, there are conflicting views on the limits of the power of the executive and the concentration of power in the hands of the PM seems to be the major characteristic of the British executive power.[24]

As there is no written Constitution, the Premier's power from the convention and royal prerogatives allow him to shape the Cabinet, as he wants. Since, the convention of collective responsibility makes ministers to agree in public with what are theoretically the Cabinet policies, the PM can use the doctrine to extend his power over the Cabinet since all ministers have the collective responsibility of defending government policies that can be the PM's own policy. Andrew Heywood[25] stresses that the most important powers of the PM over the Cabinet are constituted by the 'control of patronage'[26] that are in his hands. This implies the Premier's ability to hire and fire ministers; and, as well, to promote and demote them. Clement Atlee once said that the PM should always win over his ministers by asserting: "If you do not turn up rightly, I would sack you." Eric J. Evans[27] emphasises that 1982-8 were triumphant years for Mrs. Thatcher, as her Cabinet reshuffles during this period were designed to consolidate her dominance over the Cabinet. She dismissed most Cabinet ministers who were not loyal to her and described them as 'wet'[28]; and, appointed and promoted to highest offices those who were the true believers of her version of politics.[29] Moreover, the PM can intervene on any policy matter concerning his Cabinet and he determines its agenda and meetings. He has the power to determine the decision of the Cabinet, which can to some extent be his own decision.[30] Although in all state opening of Parliament, the government programme is read by the Queen who is as the dignified part of UK constitution, Rodney Brazier[31] asserts that the most efficient constitutional part is the Executive that comprises the PM and Cabinet. The PM can hold a Cabinet office, as Mrs. Thatcher was a minister for Civil Services.[32] The PM has the power to dissolve Parliament and call the general election; and, this can be done after manipulating the economy and other factors that will allow him to win. In addition, this shows that the Premier has more power than his Cabinet because he can determine the date of the general election without even consulting the Cabinet. While calling the general election, the PM advises the Queen to dissolve Parliament but one of the limits on his power is based on Parliament Act 1911 that limits the maximum duration of Parliamentary elected House of Commons to 5 years. Nevertheless, this does not apply in time of war and emergencies when this can be extended.

Furthermore, the PM has the power to appoint life peerages in the House of Lords, Chairmen of Cabinet and Parliamentary committees, ambassadors, senior civil servants and so forth. Today, as the PM Blair and his Labour government want to abolish hereditary peers in the House of Lords, he went further into describing hereditary peers vote against his proposed PR closed list system for MEP to be an 'affront to democracy'.[33] Moreover, the Prime Minister influences judicial and ecclesiastical appointments; and, he can sign treaties with other countries, decide on the organisation of intelligence in the country and declare war without even consulting Parliament. With the declaration of war, both Margaret Thatcher in the Falkland War and John Major in the Gulf War sent troops without Parliamentary approval but at the end of both wars, Parliament only expressed its satisfaction.[34] Without Parliament consent as well, Tony Blair announced the launch of operation Desert Fox against Iraq with "significant" UK and US involvement on December 16th 1998 at 10.20pm.[35] Therefore, this power of appointing, promoting, dismissing his Cabinet ministers, declaring war and so forth demonstrates that the Premier is more than primus inter pares since the prerogative powers and responsibilities in his hands make him more than merely first among equals vis-à-vis his Cabinet ministers.[36] In addition, the PM can as well create or abolish some other offices in the Cabinet, as Harold Wilson followed with John Major and now Blair did with the creation of the office of Deputy Prime Minister.[37]

R. A. W. Rhodes[38] observes that the Prime Ministerial power depends on individual personality, character and style since these determine how the Premier interprets the scope of his functions, the methods by which he can fulfil and achieve success.[39] For example, Mrs. Thatcher is criticised of being 'dogmatic and autocratic'[40] since in most of her time as a Premier, she dominated the Cabinet and 'stretched prime ministerial leadership to its limits.'[41] In an interview in 1979, she was reported to say: "As a Prime Minister, I could not waste my time having any internal arguments."[42] As Patrick Dunleavy[43] illustrates, the passing of poll tax into law is a very good example that shows the great pathologies of the characteristic centralisation of power under Thatcher who overrode the Cabinet and the entire government.[44] Tony Benn[45] is right to opine that:

"…the present centralisation of power in the hands of one person has gone too far and amounts to a system of personal rule in a very heart of our parliamentary democracy…"[46]

The above analysis shows that many Premiers have been dominating their Cabinets and this can be the case with Macmillan who sacked seven of his ministers. Other factors increasing the power of the PM in the late 20th century include the way the media is focussing on the individual person of the leader who is the Premier. Government has therefore increased its power on society since it seems to control almost everything in life from health, environment, foods, safety and so forth. All these resulted in many scholars[47] of constitutional law and politics to argue that the UK's constitutional and political developments have resulted in a Prime Ministerial government rather than a Cabinet government. In 1977, after examining many facets of British democracy, Lord Hailsham[48] paid tribute to the dominant position of the Cabinet and the Prime Minister today and described the UK government as being an elective dictatorship.[49]

However, since no British electorate elects directly the PM but he owes his position simply as the leader of the majority party in Parliament, this implies that his power depends more on the crucial support of his Cabinet and, especially, party members. Their support is very important for him to remain PM since he would loose power straight away, if they desert him and elect another party leader. Therefore, to avoid loosing support from their members, most PM will always pass policies that are in party line and respecting the party manifesto. Furthermore, Sir John Laws[50] asserts that even if the PM is seen as too powerful, it should be noted that there is a higher-order law, which is in the hands of the judiciary that he cannot override. He maintains that a democratic constitution is in the end undemocratic if it gives all power to its elected government, i.e. PM and his Cabinet since "it is a function of democratic power itself that it be not absolute."[51] The implication is that somebody, i.e. Judges here, must be the ones controlling the activities of the PM and his government in order to protect citizen's civil liberties.[52] The UK judiciary[53] has developed a strong judicial review mechanism[54] that allows the Court to review acts of the executive who are the Prime Minister and his Cabinet.[55]

It is right to say that the UK swings between both prime ministerial and cabinet government because strong PM come and go and usually their successors are weak. As unlike his predecessor Margaret Thatcher who was seen to be autocratic, John Major considered having more collective decisions after Cabinet debates. Dennis Kavanagh[56] explains clearly that:

"…Several factors remained consistent throughout John Major's prime ministership, namely a collegial approach to Cabinet decisions, autonomy for most secretaries of state in managing their departments, and a low-key approach to national leadership…Cabinet became a forum for more general discussion than had taken place since the days of Callaghan, and suffered no acrimonious argument…"[57]

Although Peter Hennessy[58] accuses PM Tony Blair of using a presidential style of government, it appears until now that he is combining some of the characteristics of both predecessors who are Mrs. Thatcher and John Major. For instance, he was autocratic by forcing the Labour party to reverse most of its past policies and urging his whole cabinet to back Europe ipso facto[59]. He also took many initiatives such as in the millennium and on education without consulting his Cabinet. However, in many other policy areas Blair does often get support from the senior Cabinet and party figures.[60]

Many other scholars[61] including R. A. W. Rhodes[62] are tired of discussing whether the UK has a Prime Ministerial or Cabinet government and, therefore, they have developed the new concept of 'core executive'. Patrick Dunleavy[63] says that the group includes the PM and his office, the Cabinet and its office, Cabinet committees, senior civil servants and other individuals and organisations that are close to the government. Although it is difficult to determine the people who should be included in the core executive, this concept is very important since 'it extends the analysis beyond the old concerns about PM and Cabinet to a large network of power relations in Westminster and Whitehall.'[64]

Before concluding, it appears right to suggest that there is a need to reform the UK Constitution since its structure today allows the Premier's power to become increasingly excessive vis-à-vis the Cabinet. The PM should have a department of his own like a Super-ministry in the German style because not having an office of his own makes him free to interfere in any Cabinet policy.[65] Dennis Kavanagh[66] adds that the post of Deputy Prime Minister should be regularised with a department of its own. In addition, both should get into office through direct election, which will however be hard to reconcile with Parliamentary sovereignty since it can happen that the Premier is from one party while the Parliamentary membership is dominated by another.[67] As L. S. Amery[68] rightly suggests, the Cabinet should be made smaller[69]. The number of Cabinet ministers needs to be reduced to about six or seven super-ministers instead of a large group of 23-30, as it is today where the PM controls everything since most ministers do not even get the chance to speak, as meetings lasts usually one hour. Cabinet ministers should not change departments as they often do because this makes them more generalists although the country needs as well some specialist ministers. Since the UK government is accused of being the most secretive in the world, there is a need of a Freedom of Information Act. Further, Parliament also needs to be reformed because at the present, its mechanisms of scrutiny appear to be very weak and today's Labour's majority seem to represent a constraining factor for it to check on the PM and his Cabinet properly.[70]

Therefore, as Charter 88 proposed, a written constitution can help to palliate this problem of having a powerful PM with wide power from the conventions and royal prerogatives of appointing and dismissing ministers as he wishes since, with a written constitution, his power will now be limited by the law.[71] This will also help to solve the problem of separation of power, which is not respected in the UK.[72] Election time needs to be fixed by law, as in the US where the President cannot manipulate the economy in order to call an election that will allow him to succeed. As in US politics a President cannot stay in office for more that two terms, it seems right that the PM term in office needs to be looked at since the political system allows the PM to remain in office for consecutive terms following successful elections. The written constitution should give judges the power of judicial review where they would have the power to decide whether actions of the PM are unconstitutional or ultra virus if he overrides his constitutional power vis-à-vis of the Cabinet.[73] Since the UK government is too secretive, there should be a Freedom of Information Act; and, as in Sweden where an open government is successfully applied, British government should start making Cabinet reports' public after each meeting.

In conclusion, as it was shown with Thatcher, the UK Premier is one of the most powerful leaders in western countries. Nevertheless, although the UK PM is powerful, he does not have a vast cabinet and bureaucracy as the US President or the German Chancellor have. The Premier's constitutional prerogatives power of patronage and control, which allow him to appoint, promote, demote or fire Cabinet ministers, controlling Parliament and Party, dissolving Parliament and calling general elections make him more than primus inter pares. However, it is right to say that Britain is still swinging between Cabinet and Prime Ministerial government and it will be therefore wrong to generalise the trend in the direction of Prime Ministerial government because there are many changes. Both Cabinet and Prime Ministerial government seem to be in balance and, consequently, choosing the former or the latter depends on the political realities such as the size of majority in Parliament, public opinion, personality, style and so on. From an historic perspective, strong Premiers like Churchill, Macmillan and Thatcher are usually followed by those who are weak such as Eden, Douglas-Home and John Major and, therefore, this makes it very hard to generalise or chose one form and leave the other. Moreover, many things will be ignored while choosing one or another form of government since the Premier's relationship with the Cabinet remains very secretive.   

Bibliography

1.      Bill Jones (ed.), Politics UK, 3rd Edition, Prentice-Hall, London (UK), 1998.

2.      Bill Jones, Political Issues in Britain Today, MUP, 1998.

3.      Jones, Bill et al, Politics UK, 2nd Edition, Harverster & Wheatsheaf, 1994.

4.      Jones, Bill et al, Politics UK, 1st Edition, 1991.

5.      Dunleavy/Gamble/Peele (ed.), Developments in British Politics 5, Macmillan, UK, 1997.

6.      F. Norman, N. Baldwin, Mastering British Politics, Macmillan, UK, 1996.

7.      Andrew Heywood, Politics, Macmillan Foundations, 1996.

8.      D. Kavanagh, British Politics, OUP, 1997.

9.      P. Dunleavy & G. W. Jones, Leaders Politics and Institutional Change, British Journal of Political Science, July 1994.

10.  Colin Pilkington, Issues in British Politics, Macmillan Press, UK, 1998.

11.  John Mackintosh, The British Cabinet (London: Stevens, 1962).

12.  Richard Crossman, 'Introduction' to W. Bagehot, The English Constitution (London: Fontana, 1963).

13.  Anthony King (ed.), "the British Prime Minister", 2nd Edition, London, Macmillan, 1985.

14.  Peter Hennessy, "The Blair Style of Government: An Historical Perspective and an Interim Audit", Government and Opposition/Leonard Schapiro Lecture delivered at the London School of Economics on December 2nd 1997.

15.  The Hon. Sir John Laws, Law and Democracy,

16.  Ian Budge et al, The New British Politics, Addison Wesley Longman, US, 1998.

17.  Donald Shell*, The British Constitution in 1995.

18.  David Yardley, Introduction to Constitutional & Administrative Law, 1995.

19.  Rodney Brazier, Constitutional Reform, Re-shaping the British Political System, 199.

20.  Jeffrey Jowell, The Rule of Law Today, pp. 57-78 in Jowell and Oliver (eds.) The Changing Constitution, Third Edition, 1994.

21.  A W Bradley, The Sovereignty of Parliament-in Perpetuity? pp.79-108, in Jowell and Oliver (eds) The Changing Constitution, Third Edition, 1994.

22.  McEldowney, Public Law, 1994, Chapter 7 "Public Law and Legal Thought", pp. 185-217.

23.  Bradley & Ewing, Constitutional & Administrative Law, 1993, 11th Edition, Chap. 6-7, pp. 65-110.

24.  John Alder, Constitutional & Administrative Law, Second Edition, Macmillan, London, 1994.

25.  Tony Benn, Common Sense: A New Constitution for Britain, 1993.

26.  Dawn Oliver, Written Constitutions: Principles and Problems, 1992, Parliamentary Affairs pp.135­-152.

27.  Institute for Public Policy Research, The Constitution of the United Kingdom, 1991.

28.  Sir William Wade, The Constitutional Fundamentals, Revised Edition, 1989.

29.  Colin Munro, Studies in Constitutional Law, 1987.

30.  McAuslan and McEldowney, Legitimacy and the Constitution: The Dissonance between Theory and Practice".

31.  Hall Stuart & Martin Jacques (eds.), New Times: The Changing Politics in the 1990s, Lawrence & Wishart, 1989.

32.  Walters, Malcom, Globalisation, Routledge, 1995.

33.  (Art.) Smith, Michael, Modernisation, Globalisation and the Nation-states, Ch. 13 in McGrew et al (eds.), Global Politics.

34.  The Daily Telegraph newspaper, 19th December 1997.

35.  The Times newspaper on December 12 1997.

36.  The Times reported on 22nd December 1997.

37.  (Art.) The Virtue of Civil Society, Government and Opposition, Vol. 26/1, 1996.

38.  (Art.) Robins, Kevin, Global Local Times, in James Anderson and Marylin Ricci, Society and Social Science: A Reader, Open University Press, 1990.

39.  Peele, Gillian, Governing the UK, 3rd ed., Blackwell, 1995.

40.  Rob Baggott, Pressure Group Politics in Britain: Change and Decline? p. 30.

41.  A. V. Dicey, Introduction to the Law of Constitution, Oxford, 1885.

42.  The Independent, Thursday 1st 1998.

43.  The Guardian newspaper, January 05th 1998.

44.  Hall, Stuart and Martin Jacques (eds.), The New Times: The Changing Face of Politics in the 1990s (Lawrence & Wishart, 1989).

45.  Peele, Gillian et al, Governing the UK, 3rd Ed. (Blackwell, 1995).

46.  Rosalyn Higgins, Problems and Process, 1994.

47.  The Economist, December 13th-19th 1997.

 

By Mr Jean-Paul LAWRENCE TAMPU-EYA, BA (Hon's) LL.B. (Hon's) LL.M. (London) PhD (Law Res.)

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[1] D. Kavanagh, "British Politics", OUP, 1997. See also F. Norman, N. Baldwin, "Mastering British Politics", Macmillan, UK, 1996; Bill Jones (ed.), "Politics UK", 3rd Edition, Prentice-Hall, London (UK), 1998; Bill Jones, "Political Issues in Britain Today", MUP, 1998; Jones, Bill et al, "Politics UK", 2nd Edition, Harverster & Wheatsheaf, 1994; Jones, Bill et al, Politics UK, 1st Edition, 1991 and Dunleavy/Gamble/Peele (ed.), "Developments in British Politics 5", Macmillan, UK, 1997.

[2] Bradley & Ewing, Constitutional & Administrative Law, 1993, 11th Edition, Chap. 6-7, pp. 65-110. McEldowney, Public Law, 1994, Chapter 7 "Public Law and Legal Thought", pp. 185-217.

[3] Montesquieu, "The Spirit of Laws", 1748.

[4] Montesquieu, ibid. Book 11, Chap. 6, p. 156-166.

[5] John Alder, Constitutional & Administrative Law, Second Edition, Macmillan, London, 1994, p. 221-2. See also McEldowney, Public Law, 1994, Chapter 7 "Public Law and Legal Thought", pp. 185-217

[6] Ian Budge et al, The New British Politics, Addison Wesley Longman, US, 1998, p. 219.

[7] Lord Hailsham, "Dilemma of Democracy", (Collins: London, 1977).

[8] Cabinet collegiality, departmental autonomy and Prime ministerial authority are added to these for an effective political executive.

[9] http://www.awl-he.com/politics/newbritpol

[10] John Mackintosh, "The British Cabinet" (London: Stevens, 1962).

[11] Richard Crossman, 'Introduction' to W. Bagehot, "The English Constitution" (London: Fontana, 1963).

[12] The PM Office is staffed by 35-40 people and it includes the Private Office, the Political Office, the Policy Unit and the Press Office.

[13] Anthony King (ed.), "the British Prime Minister", 2nd Edition, London, Macmillan, 1985. This is one of the best summaries of this debate.

[14] R.H.S. Crossman, "Inside View: Three Lectures on Prime Ministerial Government" (Jonathan Cape, 1972). 

[15] Ditto.

[16] Ian Budge, ibid. p. 213-223.

[17] Ian Budge et al, ibid. p. 205 where Kitchen Cabinet is defined as the loose of informal policy advise group that PM can collect around them. This may include politicians, public officials and private citizens.

[18] Ditto.

[19] Ditto. p. 209-211.

[20] Peter Hennessy, "The Blair Style of Government: An Historical Perspective and an Interim Audit", Government and Opposition/Leonard Schapiro Lecture delivered at the London School of Economics on December 2nd 1997.

[21] Ditto. p. 7.

[22] Dennis Kavanagh and Anthony Seldon, "The Cabinet and Prime Minister" in Bill Jones et al (ed.), "Politics UK", 3rd Edition, Prentice-Hall, London (UK), 1998, 295-317, at p. 297.

[23] Bill Jones (ed.), "Politics UK", 3rd Edition, Prentice-Hall, London (UK), 1998, p. 231.

[24] Ian Budge et al, ibid. (1998), p. 200-244.

[25] Andrew Heywood, "Politics", Macmillan Foundations, 1996, 324-330.

[26] Ditto.

[27] Eric J. Evans, "Thatcher and Thatcherism", Routledge, London, 1997, p. 24-52.

[28] Jones, Bill et al, Politics UK, 1st Edition, Philip Allan, London, 1991, p. 405.

[29] Eric J. Evans, ibid. p. 24.

[30] Eric J. Evans, 1997, ibid. p. 61-64.

[31] Rodney Brazier, "Constitutional Reform: Re-shaping the British Political System", Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1991, pp. 85-106.

[32] See the case of Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil Service [1984] 3 All ER 395 where Thatcher was the minister of Civil Services.

[33] Roland Watson & James Landale, "Labour takes on Peers over Proportional Reprsentation", The Times Newspapers, Wednesday November 18th 1998, p. 1.

[34] John Alder, "Constitutional & Administrative Law", Second Edition, Macmillan, 1994, pp. 216-241.

[35] The Sun Newspaper, Dec. 17th 1998, p. 1-3.

[36] Bill Jones & Dennis Kavanagh, "British Politics Toady", 3rd Edition, Mancherster University Press, 1987, p. 124.

[37] Bill Jones et al, "Politics UK", 1998, ibid. p. 205.

[38] R. A. W. Rhodes and Patrick Dunleavy (eds.), "Prime Minister, Cabinet and the Core Executive", London: Macmillan, 1995.

[39] See also J. Harvey and L. Bather, "The British Constitution and Politics", Fifth Edition, p. 229-231.

[40] Ian Budge et al, ibid. p. 215.

[41] Ditto.

[42] The Observer, February 25th 1979.

[43] Dunleavy/Gamble/Peele (ed.), "Developments in British Politics 5", Macmillan, UK, 1997.

[44] Ditto. p. 136.

[45] Tony Benn, "The Case for a Constitutional Premiership", in A. King (ed.) "The British Prime Minister" (London: Macmillan, 1985), p. 22. See also Tony Benn, "Common Sense: A New Constitution for Britain", 1993.

[46] Ditto.

[47] John Mackintosh, "The British Cabinet" (London: Stevens, 1962); Richard Crossman, 'Introduction' to W. Bagehot, "The English Constitution" (London: Fontana, 1963); Anthony King (ed.), "the British Prime Minister", 2nd Edition, London, Macmillan, 1985; & Peter Hennessy, "The Blair Style of Government: An Historical Perspective and an Interim Audit", Government and Opposition/Leonard Schapiro Lecture delivered at the London School of Economics on December 2nd 1997.

[48] Lord Hailsham, "Dilemma of Democracy", (Collins: London, 1977).

[49] Ditto.

[50] The Hon. Sir John Laws, "Law and Democracy". See his annual Public Law lecture given in summer 1994 entitled "Law and politics-No-go Areas for Judges."

[51] Ditto. p. 85.

[52] See Rosalyn Higgins, (1994) "Problems and Process", who argues that no government should pass laws and policies that are in breach of the international human rights, i.e. the International Bill of Rights. See also Peele, Gillian et al, Governing the UK, 3rd Ed. (Blackwell, 1995).

[53] See Pepper v. Hart [1993] where Lord Brown Wilkinson offered a construction of Article 9 of the Bill of Rights 1688 en route to his conclusion that there was legal inhibition upon the courts, in a proper case from looking at Hansard as an aid to the construction of main legislation.

[54] However, this is not really strong compared to the US judicial review mechanism where in Marbury v Madison [1803], Supreme Court Justices declared that they have the right to declare acts of the President and the Congress to be unconstitutional.

[55] See the Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil Service [1984] 3 All ER 395 where Lord Diplock held that the court has the right to review acts of the executive on the grounds illegality, irrationality and procedural impropriety.

[56] Dennis Kavanagh, ibid. (1998).

[57] Ditto. p. 298-299.

[58] Peter Hennessy, ibid. p. 9-11.

[59] George Jones, The Daily Telegraph, Tuesday 15th 1998, p.1, 11& 18.

[60] Ian Budge, ibid. p. 216-217.

[61] M. Bunch, "Prime Minister and Cabinet: An Executive in Transition", in R. Pyer and L. Robins (eds.), "Governing the UK in the 1990s" (London: Macmillan, 1995); P. Dorey, "Widespread, Yet Weakened: The Changing Character of Collecive Responsibility", Talking Politics, 7(2), 1994/1995; and M. Foley, "Presidential Politics in Britain", Talking Politics, 6(3), 1994. See also Ian Budge et al, ibid.

[62] R. A. W. Rhodes et al, ibid.

[63] Patrick Dunleavy, ibid. p. 178-183.

[64] Ian Budge, ibid. p. 221.

[65] Anthony King (ed.), "The British Prime Minister", 2nd Edition, London, Macmillan, 1995.

[66] Ditto. p. 301.

[67] Ditto.

[68] L. S. Amery, "Thoughts on the Constitution", Oxford University Press, 1946.

[69] See also Stacey, "The Government of Modern Britain", (Clarendon Press, 1968), p. 265-77.

[70] F. Norman, N. Bauldwin, "Mastering British Politics", Macmillan, London, 1996.

[71] See Charter 88 Movement.

[72] Montesquieu, ibid.

[73] Judges needs to have similar power as US judges have under Marbury v. Madison [1803].

________________________________________________________________________________________________  

"What role did the U.S. media play in influencing public opinion in favour of US military action in the Gulf 1990-1991?"

By Mr Jean-Paul LAWRENCE TAMPU-EYA, BA LL.B. LL.M. PhD (Law Res.)

As the Gallup Poll's "most important problem" question[1] shows, prior to the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq, in July 1990, the US was preoccupied with many domestic issues such as the state of the economy and the federal budget deficit, crime, and drug. These were even in the process of being nominated as the most important problems facing the US at that time.  However, from August, the media's lights, camera, time and its news' entire network became more concentrated on the Gulf region. Shanto Iyengar[2] confirms that:

"…Beginning in August, the Gulf absorbed virtually all network news time. The sheer amount of news peaked (at over two hours of news coverage in August) immediately following Iraqi invasion. Between September and December, news from the Gulf averaged approximately sixty minutes per month. The onset on the air war in January and Operation Desert Storm in February raised the level of coverage to about ninety minutes per month. Thus there was an initial period of saturation coverage followed by a steady state of heavy news which culminated in two months of virtual saturation coverage."[3]  

This shows that media coverage of the Gulf war significantly affected US public opinion that shifted from Vietnam syndrome's fear to support of US military action. In this presentation, I examine the role played by the U.S. media in influencing public opinion in favour of US military action in the Gulf 190-1991. After this brief introduction, firstly, I would argue that the media made the Gulf conflict capable of achieving parity with other domestic affairs. Secondly, I look at how President Bush used the media, as an instrument of manipulation, in order to boost public support for military actions and his own popularity. Thirdly, I argue that the media allowed Americans to get rid of the Vietnam syndrome. In the fourth argument, I say that President Bush used the media as a resource for his government's policy. Lastly, I conclude that the media freed Americans from suffering from the Vietnam syndrome, which made them to cast doubt in the abilities of their troops.  

The media played a major role in influencing public opinion in favour of US military action in the Gulf 190-1991. Firstly, the Gulf conflict was capable of achieving parity with other domestic affairs such as the economy and deficit as an agenda item as early as October because of the media. By November, its references through the media surpassed that of the economy and it became the most pre-eminent national issue in the American public eyes. During February, around the end of the war, the Gulf received greater share of US public attention than other problems such as the economy, deficit, crime, drugs and others. However, rapidly after the war the Gulf disappeared from the public's agenda, as the economy came to overshadow all other domestic issues. This was because:

"…Overall, the amount of media coverage accorded to the Gulf situation and the proposition of respondents nominating it as the nation's most important problem were highly correlated (r = .85). Most discussions of agenda-setting are unidirectional in nature-increases in news coverage are thought to bring about increases in the salience of particular issues or events…"[4]

For this reason, Vice President Agnes criticised the media, as too powerful in its influence over public opinion. The media is generally accused of being merely a transmitter of the government and ruling elites' facts and opinions for public consumption. For most people, television and radio news programs constitute the principal source of information about foreign affairs. About one third of adult population composes the collective audience of the news network. Thus, Thomas L. Brewer[5] says that mass media is an instrument used by elites to manipulate public opinions since:

"…The government and the press have routinely co-operated during wartime to censor news about military actions…Reporting of the Persian war was severely curtailed…"

Secondly, President Bush had the opportunity to influence public opinion in order to use military action against Iraq because he has direct access to the media many times than other members of the administration, as he represents US people[6]. Hence, with such access to the public, President Bush manipulated the public, as he succeeded in creating a climate favourable to military action[7]. He convinced American public to put domestic problems they were facing aside since the Gulf crisis was of a paramount importance to US strategic interests. President Bush therefore fought a fiercest fight for public opinion, as most US leaders did since the World War I, and so did the whole US administration that were involved. Because of US strategic interests in the Middle East, Bush succeeded in convincing the public through the media that US interests in the Gulf were enough to risk American citizens' lives. As Johanna Neuman[8] argues, from Vietnam to the Falklands' wars, the major lesson that American military planners brought to the Gulf war was "the need for public support"; which Bush won for military action. That is why John Zaller[9] criticises the media as the government's tool of propaganda. He confirms that:

"…The media vilified Saddam as a new Hitler…any negative coverage of Iraq would have been equally effective in mobilising mass support for war, so long as partisan, ideological, and other leaders communicated to the public their belief that war was necessary"[10]

Richard A. Broady[11] asserts that news content truly brought public support for military action since the public apparently used the information principally brought to it by the media. This seems to mean that the factors affecting news content affected public opinion during the Gulf war[12]. 

Baghdad, as well, joined the battle for public opinion, which did not work as Saddam wished since it ended in favour of the West, as he turned to be described as a tyrant. This was when he wanted to show his welfare concern for the Western guests' he held hostage, Saddam inquired of seven-year old Briton hostage, Stuart Lockwood by asking the child: "Did Stuart have his milk today?" That question, aired on Iraqi television, was straight away picked up by CNN and then transmitted all over the world. Consequently, with chilled public opinion in the West, Saddam was seen as an evil and the world cemented him as a tyrant. Thomas L. Brewer[13] gives the opinion that media is the most obvious source of public information on foreign policy and it is therefore expected to provide detailed and accurate information on foreign policy issues, which could normally allow the public to develop and form their factually based opinions. Because of the media, foreign policy became then concentrated in the Gulf and it was seen as an important issue, which even brought US public to start evaluating their President on[14]. Nevertheless, Mr Bush has to be given some credit because, together with his government, he successfully used the media while mobilising the US public in favour of military action during the Gulf war. It should be noted, however, that elite leadership and the media go hand in hand because whenever elites are united in support of a foreign policy such as the Gulf crises politically aware US citizens would seem to support that policy more strongly than any other part of the public[15].

Thirdly, since US foreign policy legacy is that Americans do not want to see another Vietnam because of the Vietnam syndrome, President Bush used the media in influencing US public opinion in favour of military actions against Iraq. This is because most Americans give President the benefit of the doubt in foreign policy since they see him as the expert and they think that he knows better; and, the President himself does much to encourage it. Therefore, the US public was vulnerable to political manipulations by President Bush, who used the media to convince them on any foreign policy he had put during the Gulf war. This shows that the media played an important role in shaping US public opinion in favour of military actions in the Gulf war. The media allowed Americans to get rid of the Vietnam syndrome because although US public was reluctant to support the hypothesis of military resolution, the media's episodic framing of the Gulf crisis increased the viewers' support of military action. Thomas L. Brewer admits that although the public was evenly divided about whether to undertake military action against Iraq just prior the initiation of hostilities, public opinion became predominantly supportive in the early days of the war because of the media.[16] John Zaller[17] agrees with Lang and Lang[18] surveys that the media played an important role in shaping US public opinion in support of military action during the Gulf crisis. He asserts that:

"…Few Americans knew anything about Iraq before the invasion of Kuwait, but after few weeks of media exposure to the consensual view that Saddam Hussein who was not even a communist, was too dangerous to be allowed to get away with swallowing Kuwait…, the country was, though not eager for war, quite prepared to accept it…"[19]

In the fourth place, since the Gulf war took place at the time of the development of technology, as the TV satellite with CNN was broadcasting all over the world, the media was used as a resource for President Bush government. This is since the media was allowing the Bush government to understand the domestic and international reactions to US policies and military actions. The development of technology in the media unquestionably played an important role in forming public opinion in favour of military action, as people were able to watch the Gulf war. Patrick O'Heffernan[20] notes that with the development of technology, the media got record rating in popularity, US government got public support with only little criticism and investigation, and the public was well entertained by watching the Gulf war live. The new technology gave Peter Arnett of CNN the opportunity to report the war from the enemy's camp in Baghdad but the truth is that:

"…With international network devoted to the fastest possible dissemination of news no matter its origin, there is no enemy territory anymore. The Iraqis invited Arnett to Baghdad to get their message to a vaster audience…Real-time reporting from behind their lines…also real-time intelligence to US military commanders, allowing them to assess damage to the enemy territory. The battlefield for public acceptance has few borders."[21]

Shanto Iyengar agrees with Walter Lippmann[22] that nearly seventy years ago, the public knew little about what was happening and what ought to happen in wars and around the globe but, in modern times, thanks to CNN, NBC, ABC, CBS, and now BBC World people have "pictures in their heads". The satellite television, CNN, brought war brought war to not only the Americans themselves but also to the international audience and everyone was watching at the same time, as viewers could watch the war. This shows that the new media has eliminated the barriers between audience and information and it is now right to establish that the media:

"…Has a significant impact on public opinion. The Gulf war was a mediated issue par excellence, and the results shown here, that American public opinion would follow the course of television news coverage, were predictable. The influence of the media inevitably gives rise to a host of questions concerning the determinants of news coverage and the practice of public-affairs journalism"[23].

Before concluding, it seems right to mention that after the Gulf war in 1991, the use of media helped President George Bush to enjoy an unprecedented 92 percent of public approval for a short time. Such figure indicate that a president can expect a well media publicised event, such as the Gulf war, to yield a moderate short term increase in support for a specific policy or for his performance in general. While as the time goes on, the support may stabilise at the new high level or it may as well decline a previous level or even go lower.[24] As it is illustrated in the Gulf war, the media plays a major role in shaping public opinion. It is therefore right to suggest that US democracy will work poorly or maybe would not work at all unless the media provides American citizens with enough information that could help them to form a balanced assessment of public opinions of major issues generally. Johana Neuman[25] agrees that the media in the Gulf war permitted American administration and citizens to bury the Vietnam syndrome, as President Bush proclaimed victory on March 1st 1991, at the end of the war, by saying:

"It's a proud day for Americans…By God we've licked the Vietnam syndrome once and for all…"      

Ms Neuman's[26] argument stating that "Technology unquestionably played a role in the Persian Gulf war" brings this work to conclude that the media played an important role in influencing public opinion in favour of US military action in the Gulf 1990-1991. Firstly, the media made the Gulf conflict capable of achieving parity with other domestic affairs such as the economy and deficit as an agenda item and in some instance, it even surpassed these domestic issues. Secondly, President Bush used the media in order to boost public support for military actions with his own popularity as, normally, international crises increase public support for the President. All this since the public usually looks at the president as the expert and, as well, President himself tends to encourage it. Thirdly, while influencing the US public opinion is support of military actions, the media allowed Americans to get rid of the Vietnam syndrome. In a narrow sense, the military victory in the Gulf war that was brought by a successful use of the media restored confidence in the US military spirit that was dampened in Vietnam because the war was fought with few casualties against petty tyrants.  Lastly, the media was used as a resource by Bush government since they could easily know how people react to their policy at home and abroad. Briefly, it is true to say that the media freed Americans from suffering from the Vietnam syndrome, which made them to cast doubt in the abilities of their troops.

Bibliography

1.      Johana Neuman, "Lights, Camera, War: Is the Media Technology Driving International Politics?" Library of Congress, St Martin's Press, 1996.

2.      Joan E. Spero, "The Politics of International Economic Relations", Fifth Edition, St Martin's Press, 1997.

3.      Shanto Iyengar and Adam Simon, "New Coverage of the Gulf Crisis and Public Opinion: A Study of Agenda setting, Priming, and Flaming" in W. L. Bennet and D.L. Paletz (ed.) "Taken by Storm. The Media, Public Opinion and US Foreign Policy in the Gulf War" (Chicago IL: University of Chicago Press, 1994).

4.      Thomas L. Brewer, "American Foreign Policy: A Contemporary Introduction", Fourth Edition, Prentice Hall Inc., 1997.

5.      John Zaller, "Elite Leadership of Mass opinion" in W. L. Bennet and D.L. Paletz (ed.) "Taken by Storm. The Media, Public Opinion and US Foreign Policy in the Gulf War" (Chicago IL: University of Chicago Press, 1994).

6.      B. Allen et al, "The Media and the Golf War: Framing, Priming, and the Spiral of Silence?" Polity XXVII, No. 2 (winter 1996), 255-284.

7.      H. Smith (ed.) "The Media and the Gulf War" (Washington D.C.: Seven Locks Press, 1992).

8.      J.Mueller, "Policy and Public Opinion in the Gulf War", (Chicago IL: University of Chicago Press, 1994).

9.      Richard A. Broady, "The Media and Public Support for the President", in W. L. Bennet and D.L. Paletz (ed.) "Taken by Storm. The Media, Public Opinion and US Foreign Policy in the Gulf War" (Chicago IL: University of Chicago Press, 1994), pp. 211-227.

10.  Patrick O'Heffernan, "Media Influence in U.S. Foreign Policy" in W. L. Bennet and D.L. Paletz (ed.) "Taken by Storm. The Media, Public Opinion and US Foreign Policy in the Gulf War" (Chicago IL: University of Chicago Press, 1994), pp. 231-249.

11.  B. Russet, "Doves, Hanks and Public Opinion", Political science Quarterly 105, 4 (110-1), pp. 514-638.

 

By Mr Jean-Paul LAWRENCE TAMPU-EYABA (Hon's) LL.B. (Hon's) LL.M. (London) PhD (Law Res.)

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[1] The Gallup Poll's "most important problem" question between July 1990 and March 1991.

[2] Shanto Iyengar and Adam Simon, "New Coverage of the Gulf Crisis and Public Opinion: A Study of Agenda setting, Priming, and Flaming" in W. L. Bennet and D.L. Paletz (eds.) "Taken by Storm. The Media, Public Opinion and US Foreign Policy in the Gulf War" (Chicago IL: University of Chicago Press, 1994), pp. 167-185. 

[3] Ibid., at p. 176.

[4] Shanto Iyengar, ibid., pp. 177-8.

[5] Thomas L. Brewer, "American Foreign Policy: A Contemporary Introduction", Fourth Edition, Prentice Hall Inc., 1997, 160-186, at 174. 

[6] H. Smith (ed.) "The Media and the Gulf War" (Washington D.C.: Seven Locks Press, 1992).

[7] Thomas L. Brewer, ibid., p. 178.

[8] Ibid., p. 222.

[9] John Zaller, "Elite Leadership of Mass opinion" in W. L. Bennet and D.L. Paletz (ed.) "Taken by Storm. The Media, Public Opinion and US Foreign Policy in the Gulf War" (Chicago IL: University of Chicago Press, 1994), pp. 200-1.

[10] Ibid., p. 201.

[11] Richard A. Broady, "The Media and Public Support for the President", in W. L. Bennet and D.L. Paletz (ed.) "Taken by Storm. The Media, Public Opinion and US Foreign Policy in the Gulf War" (Chicago IL: University of Chicago Press, 1994), pp. 211-227.

[12] Ibid., at p. 225.

[13] Ditto.

[14] J.Mueller, "Policy and Public Opinion in the Gulf War", (Chicago IL: University of Chicago Press, 1994).

[15] John Zaller., ditto.

[16] Thomas L. Brewer, ibid., p. 169.

[17] Ditto.

[18] Lang and Lang, in W. L. Bennet and D.L. Paletz (eds.) "Taken by Storm. The Media, Public Opinion and US Foreign Policy in the Gulf War" (Chicago IL: University of Chicago Press, 1994).

[19] John Zaller, ditto., p. 199.

[20] Patrick O'Heffernan, "Media Influence in U.S. Foreign Policy" in W. L. Bennet and D.L. Paletz (ed.) "Taken by Storm. The Media, Public Opinion and US Foreign Policy in the Gulf War" (Chicago IL: University of Chicago Press, 1994), pp. 231-249, at p. 244.

[21] Johanna Neuman, ditto., p. 218.

[22] See Shanto Iyengar and Adam Simon, Ibid., p. 183.

[23] Ditto.

[24] Thomas L. Brewer, ibid., pp. 184-5.

[25] Johana Neuman, ibid., pp. 218-219.

[26] Ditto., p. 224.

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

"Why is-it claimed that the weakness of most 'Third World' countries is due to lack of legitimacy and political institutionalisation?" 

By Mr Jean-Paul LAWRENCE TAMPU-EYA, BA LL.B. LL.M. PhD (Law Res.)

This essay is structured as follows: after a brief introduction stating that lack of legitimacy and political institutionalisation are the result of past colonial history, this essay argues, firstly, that lack of political legitimacy is one of the main weaknesses in Third World countries. Here, the relationship between the state and society is looked at. It is shown that colonialism, people’s lack of trust for their government, political manipulation by the state’s elite and world greater powers etc. are all principal causes of lack of legitimacy and political institutionalisation. Secondly, this work looks at the reasons that keep Third World leaders in power even though there is this weakness of lack of legitimacy and political institutionalisation. Looking at most Third World regimes, it is remarked generally that there are personalist, patrimonial, neo-patrimonial, clientelist, bureaucratic authoritarian and populist regimes. Since there seems to be a failure to achieve both legitimacy and political institutionalisation, Third World leaders find these regimes, which are different in kinds as they sometimes overlap and others are hybrid, as their main way to stay longer in power. Lastly, it concludes that 'Third World' countries' weakness is mainly lack of legitimacy and political institutionalisation. This is due to the absence of the relationship that should exist between state and society; and, as a result, most leaders take power illegally and use the above regimes as a way of staying in power.

There is nothing as a typical Third World country but B.C. Smith[1] defines it as:

"A group of countries which have colonial histories and which are in the process of developing economically and socially from a status characterised by low incomes, dependence on agriculture, weakness in trading relations, social deprivation for large segments of society, and restricted political and civil liberties".[2]

The lack of legitimacy and political institutionalisation in Third World countries seems to come from the time of state formation due to colonial past histories because the relationship between the state and society is practically non-existent. In the Third World, unlike Western Europe, colonial rulers imposed the state into nation in order to form nation-state. They imposed their political, economic, civil, social and cultural systems to the Third World without taking into account the indigenous’ civilisations and cultures. Hence, slavery, colonialism, neo-colonialism, political manipulations and other Western impositions in the Third World countries have all contributed to this problem of lack of legitimacy and political institutionalisation. Walter Rodney[3] blames slavery, colonialism and western manipulations through education systems as the source of puppet regimes, lack of legitimacy and political institutionalisation in the third world. Jeff Haynes[4] agrees with Engels and Marks that the colonial states were imposed on the Third World. He explains that:

"…Nearly all Third World states are artificial constructions. Whereas in Western Europe and North America the nation nearly always created the state, in the Third World the reverse is more usually true: state formation precedes nation building"[5].

As in all colonies, colonialists imposed their rules regardless of the people's cultures, languages and differences when they had their cake and ate it at the Berlin Conference, in 1885, while, for example, dividing Africa amongst themselves as it pleased them. That is why Tutsis people are found in Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi, Tanzania and the R.D. Congo; as a result, this is one of the principal sources of conflicts within African's Great Lakes' regions. Consequently, the essential nexus or relationship, which is supposed to exist between the state and society and vice versa, does not exist and this absence makes the creation of political institutions and the issue of legitimacy very difficult to sustain. This shows that the solidity of the relationship between state and society depends on this nexus and if society and state do not meet somewhere, people would not recognise the authority of the state with its political institutions. Jeff Haynes puts that:

"…Many ordinary people in the Third World do not see their state as a reasonably coherent champion of society interests at home and abroad, a set of institutions whose personnel work for the common good. Instead, the state is often regarded as the vehicle for the self-interest of an often tiny elite…"[6]

Max Weber[7] asserts that a state is "…a compulsory association claiming control over territories and the people within them. Administrative, legal, extractive and coercive organisations are the core of any state". Normally, state imposes its authority through legitimacy and strong political institutions. It appears that, apart from the external factors such as the UN and other international institutions that any contemporary state deals with, state’s main function is internally oriented because it has to maintain political and economical orders, which involves that state's legitimacy is an important way of achieving it. However, Jeff Haynes argues that, outside the West, nation and state do not more or less coincide since most developing countries have within their borders a variety of culturally separate people who seem to find it difficult to regard the state as their sole and primary source of legitimacy. As a result, there is a lack of legitimacy because political interactions, between, firstly, different religious and ethnic groups and, secondly, between the state and various groups, are characterised by violence, tensions and conflicts. For these reasons, civil societies are weak and therefore this facilitates the domination of elite in the Third World.

The above argument shows that political legitimacy, which is defined as a shared conviction by the people of their ruler's unshaken right to rule, is very important in achieving state's authority since its lack represents a major weakness[8]. State's authority is directly undermined in the case where there is no political legitimacy because "…a government may be recognised as legitimate by its own citizens…" and without it, government has no authority to pass and change laws and this would be a major weakness for the state. Paul Cammack[9] highlights four main sources of the crises of legitimacy in developing countries, which are:

"…conflicting or inadequate bases for claiming authority; excessive and uninstitutionalized competition for power; the basing of claims to authority on unacceptable readings of history or faulty predictions of future developments; and inappropriate socialisation and feeling about the authority among the people which were not functional for the effort of leaders. The twin processes of differentiation and pressure for equality called traditional claims for authority into question, particularly in new states where 'the old forms of authority have lost their basis for effectively structuring life".[10]

As a consequence of lack of legitimacy Third Word state passes laws that are not obeyed by citizens because they see that the state does not represent the people’s interests but elite's personal interests. Diamond[11] argues that a major problem for most third world countries is that they are locked into a vicious circle of low legitimacy, which result in an ineffective government performance.

Sometimes lack of legitimacy comes from political manipulations that most Third World countries are suffering in hands of Western powers. During the Cold War, for example, most Third World leaders, i.e. Mobutu (Zaire), Shah (Iran), Habyarimana (Rwanda) etc. took power and stood longer in office not because they were freely elected by their people in the ballot box but because it was in the West's best and strategic interests. Lucky Dube[12] emphasises that Third World states lack legitimacy because most of their leaders are 'puppet' as they are in power not for the sake of their people but to serve Western powers who had put them in power. Walter Rodney adds that the West mostly chooses Third World leaders who are in their political and economic interests. As Colette Braeckmann[13] illustrates, after placing and supporting Joseph Mobutu and his General Council in one-year power trial to serve their interests, the West killed Patrice Lumumba in 1961. Lumumba, the first ever-elected Prime Minister of the Democratic Republic of Congo, was killed because he was seen to be hostile to Western interests during the Cold War[14]. In his second coup d’etat in 1965, the West backed Mobutu again in his brutal regime for 32 years until he was overthrown by Laurent-Desire Kabila's forces on 17th May 1997. Thomas L. Brewer[15] explains clearly that, either acting alone or sometimes giving logistical support to other Western powers to protect their interests, the US intervenes militarily or in covert actions with its intelligence agencies in support of puppet governments in the third world regardless of the people's will. For instance, the US provided air transport for Indian supplies and troops during a 1962 border war with China and, for many years, it, as well, conducted patrols in Farmosa Strait between Taiwan and China. Finally, whenever there was an uprising or revolts against President Mubutu’s brutal regime in Zaire, the French and Belgian troops used to get US logistical support in order to protect Mobutu's pro-West's regime from collapsing.

Colonial powers' way of ruling their colonies basing their power on conquest and brutality can also be blamed for today's lack of legitimacy in the Third World[16] since although most Third World countries have rejected colonialism, their leaders seem to claim their power by virtue of being colonial power's successors. As a result, a series of military governments take power again and again with a brutal use of force as it was recently the case in Sierra Leone and Congo-Brazzaville. Ghana, Nigeria and Burundi, where military coup d'etat with force took place lots of times since independence is another example. Susan Calvert expresses her opinion that 'Western colonisation' is being replaced by an 'internal colonisation', which means that large parts of many third world countries are being colonised by their own ruling elite[17]. For instance, Hausas appear to be reluctant to share power with the people of other tribes in Nigeria and this looks like the Hausas are colonising other Nigerians. B. C. Smith[18] asserts that some third world political leaders such as Ayatollah of Iran had put religion as the basis of legitimacy. This is since religion fills an ideological vacuum and it remains a source of popular mobilisation, resistance and even insurrection. Corruption and bribe payments by foreign companies and their agents and through the support of corrupted regimes provide another weakness that causes lack of legitimacy and political institutionalisation.[19] 

Samuel Huntington[20] argues that absence of stronger political institutions is another major weakness of most 'Third World' countries. He asserts that fragility and frequent breakdown of democracy in the Third World are due to weak institutionalisation of political controls during the period of growth of a mass politics because of societal divisions, tensions and conflicts. Because of this, the military would feel duty bound to use force to take power through a coup d'etat in order to reimpose public order. As in most western countries, political institutionalisation comes through constitutionalism, which is the basis of the rule of the game where a code of conduct regulating the relationship between political institutions and the rulers with the ruled is imposed. John Alder[21] asserts that constitutionalism is based on the concepts of rule of law and separation of power, that is, a government limited by law, which involves that there is a sphere of freedom that is not a business of state's law. Susan Calvert[22] argues that political institutionalisation is one of the main way in which state's authority and legitimacy is implemented and, however, it can only be accomplished with a sound working Constitution since without it Third World states will still experience many military coup d'etat supported by strong corrupted bureaucracies.

As in many liberal societies, one of the main purposes of the constitution is to restrain the exercise of arbitrary political power and to enshrine basic Human Rights and freedoms. However, one of the weaknesses in Third World is a weak constitution since their constitutions don’t work because they have blindly adopted Western constitutions without taking into account the political, social, economic, and cultural differences between them[23]. The Middle East with Nasser, Saddam Hussein, Ayatollah, Saudi Arabia etc. illustrate this argument and, as a result, Susan Calvert[24] remarks that there is usually an imposition of personal rule because most Third World countries lack sound political institutionalisation. Therefore, without sound political institutionalisation, third world states experience many military take over supported by strong corrupted bureaucracies as the main agents since they are the sole contact with outside people.

While comparing third world countries such as Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, Chile and Mexico, Guillermo O'Donnell[25] identified an underlying common historical sequence, which start from oligarchic political systems in which power, both political and economic, is held through personalism, clientelism and only by a small number of families. Then follows a phase of populist politics eventually degenerating into bureaucratic authoritarianism. All this is because most third world leaders achieve and hold power without legitimacy and sound political institutionalisation; i.e. most of these leaders reach power unconstitutionally or through the back door.

Since most third world states do not have a constitution that works, this lack of legitimacy and political institutionalisation make their leaders' authority to derive, firstly, from personalism. Personalism is defined as a system whereby the authority is attributed to a person rather than the holder of an office, i.e. political institution such as the Presidency. Personalism can be achieved through different ways and one of it is patrimonialism, which is mostly based on personal loyalties with networks of family and personal ties and kinship. It is characterised by the top to bottom. However, nowadays, patrimonialism has developed to neo-patrimonial regime that can or cannot be led by a charismatic leader. Myth and personal ties lead neo-patrimonial regime and these are more important than institutional rules. For example, Khomeini in Iran, Nkrumah in Ghana, Saddam Hussein in Iraq, Mobutu in Zaire, Suharto and Habibie in Indonesia and others illustrate the neo-patrimonial regimes. Since instead of having political institutions that work, it is characterised by a personalised leadership. The then Indonesian government of President Suharto shows that most third world government's appointments are related to personal ties and kinship such as friends and family members. The Times[26] outlined the Indonesian problem by asserting:

"…The cabinet draws on old friends and his daughter, Tutut, in an arrangement that will send all wrong signals to the international community… Mr Suharto's golfing partner, Mohammad "Bob" Hassan, mastermind of one of the most profitable monopolies becomes Minister of Trade and Industry…"

While criticising Suharto's government of undue favouritism, the Muslim leader Amien Rais argued:

"How can it be possible that a father is President and his daughter is a Cabinet minister…It is a very clear sign of nepotism…"[27]     

Nevertheless, The Times[28] reported that students demonstrations and occupation of Indonesian Parliament brought President Suharto's government under its knees because it was characterised by collusion, corruption and nepotism, which all involve lack of legitimacy and sound political institutionalisation. Moreover, Suharto's successor, who is his own best friend and former vice President, Jusuf Habibie, has already appointed a cabinet that most people accuse again of favouring nepotism and composed by the same corrupt people. Edward Marek[29] asserts that Laurent Desire Kabila's government[30] in the Democratic Republic of Congo is another example of nepotism since President Kabila's cousin, Gaetan Kukudji, occupies four main posts in the government. Mr Kakudji is at the same time "super" minister (i.e. State's Minster), Minister of Interior, Governor of the Katanga province (where almost 60 per cent of government revenues come from) and the deputy General Secretary of the AFDL, which is the sole and unique political party in the Country. In addition, people who come from the same district with the President occupy most government key posts and his son, Joseph Kabila, is the army chief in the High Congo province.

Furthermore, Susan Calvert explains that Pakistan can be seen as the personal fiefdom of the Bhutto's family, whom country's politics has degenerated into family members' factional infighting. Much of Pakistan's social structure is essentially feudal and most Pakistani still live in rural areas where the local lands aristocracy often dispenses an arbitrary feudal justice. As the Bhutto's family and Prime Minister Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, about eighty per cent of Pakistan's politicians come from aristocratic families. Al Haq's Muslim League, which is starting to look dynastic as well as personalist, is the principal civilian opposition in Pakistan. All politicians, in this case, rely first and foremost on local people to whom they are "patrons" and this, by the way, involves clientelism. Clientelism is a relationship engaging the attentions of 'patrons', i.e. government leaders, and 'clients', i.e. the people, so that each party benefits from the mutually advantageous relationship. Clientelism is therefore another way Third World leaders use to hold their political power. For example, in Latin America politicians promise people that members of their families and friends would get jobs and privileges if they vote for them. [31]

Nowadays, it appears that personalism, patrimonial and clientelism are evolving into bureaucratic authoritarian in most Third World countries. In bureaucratic authoritarian, there are elections 'only by name' because the winner is always known before even elections take place and there is more belief in authority rather than citizens' civil liberties and freedoms. Singapore and Mexico are good examples where bureaucratic authoritarian tries to work. However, bureaucratic authoritarian appears to be a system that is vulnerable because its survival depends on greater elite's consensus. R. Sandbrook[32] explains that elite see authoritarianism as a legitimate way to manage crisis. Since order is made to be the highest good in politics, people's rights, especially women's rights are denied, and elites describe opponents of their regimes as 'system wreckers'. This is since 'the interest in order of those at the top is given logical precedence over the interest in social justice of those below'.[33] Nevertheless, bureaucratic authoritarian seems to be powerful internally with daily use of coercion while, at the same time, it is fragile since there are many crises that occur. In post-Cold War, bureaucratic authoritarian is very fragile; and, only simple protests such as the Indonesian demonstrations can end it because it lacks legitimacy. In addition, Thomas L. Brewer[34] argues, most Western powers tend to relate their Third World socio-economic aid to the implementation of democracy, rule of law and respect of Human Rights in this post-Cold War era with an increasing globalisation. Therefore, any authoritarian regime is likely to loose support of international financial institutions and the international community as a whole[35].

B.C. Smith[36] says that populism is another way which third world despots use to keep their power without legitimacy and political institutionalisation. Here, leaders put their entire efforts in mobilising the mass via mass media and other means. For instance, while using Mobutuism as the philosophy of the 21st century, President Mobutu succeeded in brain washing Zairean people because he was very good in mobilising the mass with his MOPAP and other dirty tricks[37]. However, to some extent, populist regimes appear to be stronger than patrimonialism, clientelism and bureaucratic authoritarian systems since, here, the ruler's legitimacy comes from popular mobilisation and this makes the populist leaders to stand crisis better than others because they change masses to the people[38].

In this time of globalisation, although there is still lack of legitimacy and political institutionalisation in the Third World, it seems however that there is a way towards democratic governments. Democracy, in this sense, is defined as a 'rule by the people' or simply 'majority rule'[39] and in today's shrinking world, it is believed that people cannot have rights without democracy and most states, including those in the Third World, call themselves democracies. Although democracy is starting to take place in the third world, it does not seem right to say that there is a real democracy, as it is in the West, because until now most leaders are not freely and fairly elected by the people. James N. Danziger[40] describes Brazil, Ghana, Botswana, South Africa, Costa Rica, Ecuador and many others as good steps towards democracy in the Third World because they appear to have democratic governments. In Brazil, for example, about twenty years ago, the President was impeached legally because of corruption and no military take over took place and the vice president became the acting president until another election took place. L. Diamond[41] highlights that Botswana is the most stable country in Africa because it has a democracy that works. It seems that the recent collapse of President Suharto's government in Indonesia sent a chill through third world regimes across Asia, from China to Burma, Africa and Latin America[42]. B.C. Smith[43] agrees with L. Diamond that in Latin America democratic cultures have helped to maintain democracy and this made it more difficult to perpetuate and consolidate autocratic and dictatorship government. This was illustrated in Chile in 1988, with Pinnochet, and Uruguay in 1980 where "both the fact of plebiscites and the ultimate popular rejections of the military at the polls reflected the continuing validity of democratic culture"[44]. South Africa, with its decision of forming “one nation with many diversities”, as President Mandela put it, is another sign of progress towards democracy in the third world. Moreover, as Francis Fukuyama[45] put it, liberal democracy is 'the final form of human government' because the end of the Cold War implies that history has ended with the triumph of western ideas of freedom, democracy, rule of law and free market economy. For this reason, many third world countries are obliged to democratise as Western aid is now being related to the process of democratisation, free markets and respect of basic Human Rights. The recent US President tour of Africa where Bill Clinton signed a pact, with several African leaders in Entebbe (Uganda), which said basically that the US will trade with states that promote democratisation, respect of Human Rights[46] and eliminate genocide, shows how third countries are obliged to democratise. In this case, it can be argued that political institutions have started working in the third world although the people are still suffering, starving and still being victims of the injustices[47].

It seems right to suggest before concluding that the establishment of a rational and secular state authority based upon law is one of the most effective responses to third world's weakness of lack of legitimacy and political institutionalisation. While agreeing with Pye and Huttington, Paul Cammack[48] emphasises that:

"Before there can be a question of legitimacy and authority there must be the realities of power: and the sorrow of many developing countries is that they have no institutions capable of directing and managing all the tasks that must be accomplished if these countries are to achieve their goals of modernisation … the inappropriate ways in which people in a society have been taught about the authority…"[49]

 

This shows that when there are no stable institutions for ordering and channelling politics, political competition might lead to raw power struggles. Hence, democracy, dynamic leadership, respect of the people's self determination and Human Rights with good decision-making process are among the solutions to the crises caused by lack of legitimacy and political institutionalisation. Nevertheless, Paul Hirst[50] indicates that this development can only come if there are economic growth and modernisation because governments are only legitimate in so far as they meet the economic, social, civil, cultural and political needs of their citizens. Consequently, the governments that fails to provide these basic needs, as in most Third World countries, are judged by their people to be illegitimate whether or not they are democracies[51]. 

In conclusion, lack of legitimacy and political institutionalisation are the result of colonialism, which made the relationship between state and society mostly non-existent. Therefore, colonialism, people’s lack of trust in their government, political manipulation by the state’s elite and world greater powers etc. are the main causes of this lack of legitimacy and political institutionalisation. Because there is no nexus between state and society, achievement of legitimacy and political institutionalisation become difficult. This is since there are no sound political institutions and civil societies capable of mediating, redefining and moderating between states and societies (citizens). As a result, Third World leaders find personalism, patrimonialism, neo-patrimonial, clientelism, bureaucratic authoritarian and populist regimes as their ways of protecting political power since their power is not legitimate. In seeking to solve this weakness and accommodate their countries to the modern world, a sound constitution where the rule of law[52] is enshrined appears to be very important because “ibi jus ibi remedium”.[53] A sound constitution is therefore very important to solve the Third World countries' weakness of lack of legitimacy and political institutionalisation since it is where the doctrine of the separation of powers, i.e. "the checks and balances doctrine"[54], is enshrined. It can really be an instrument of change because if everyone respects the constitution, government officials and citizens will behave according to it and the government will respect citizens’ rights and liberties as they are enacted.

Bibliography

1.                    Colette Braeckman, "Le Zaire de Mobutu: Le Dinosaur", 1991

2.                    Susan Calvert and Peter Calvert, "Politics and Society in the Third world: An Introduction", Pentice Hall Europe, Herts., 1996.

3.                    John Alder, "Constitutional and Administrative Law", Second Edition, The Macmillan Press Ltd., 1994.

4.                    L. Diamond (1988)"Introduction: Roots of Failure, Seeds of Hope", in L. Diamond, J.J. Linz and S.M. Lipset (Eds.) Democracy in Developing Countries, vol. 2, Africa. Bouder: Lynne Reinner Publishers.

5.                    Diamond et al (eds.), "Introduction: Comparing experiences with Democracy", in Diamond et al (eds.) Politics of Developing Countries: Comparing Experiences with Democracy, London, Lynne Rienners Publishers, 1990.

6.                    Diamond and J.J. Linz, "Introduction: Politics, Society and democracy in Latin America", in L. Diamond et al (eds.) Democracy in Developing Countries, vol. 4, Latin America, Boulder: Lynne Reinner Publishers, 1989.

7.                    Ian Mclean, "Oxford Concise Dictionary of Politics", Oxford University         Press,          1996.

12.                 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, "The Social Contract", 1762.

13.                 Stephen Gill, "Theorising the Integrum: The Double Movement and Global Politics in the 1990s", in Robert Cox et al, "International Political Economy: Understanding Global Disorder", London, Zed Books Ltd., 1995.

14.                 Lucky Dube, "Puppet Masters" in "Trinity", Tabu, 1995.

15.                 Paul Cammack, "Capitalism and Democracy in the Third World: The Doctrine for Political Development", London, Leicester University Press, 1997.

16.                 Thomas L. Brewer, "American Foreign Policy: A contemporary Introduction", Fourth Edition, 1997.

17.                 Walter Rodney, (1988), "How Europe Underdeveloped AFRICA", Bogle L'Ouverture Publications Ltd., London.

18.                 Paul Hirst & Grahame Thomson, (1996), "Globalisation in Question", Polity Press, Cambridge, UK, pp. 99-120.

19.                 John Gray, "Global Utopias and Clashing Civilisations", International Affairs 74, I (1998) pp. 149-164.

20.                 Rosalyn Higgins, "Problems and Process: International Law, How We Use It", 1994.

21.                 Sabam, "The European Issues: Human Rights in International law", Council of Europe Publishing, Brussels, 1992.

22.                 A.H. Robertson & J.G. Merrills, "Human Rights in the world: An Introduction to the study of International Protection of Human Rights", 3rd Edition, 1992.

23.                 I. Brownlie, "Basic Documents in Human Rights", second edition, Oxford, 1981.

24.                 Montesquieu, “The Spirit of Laws

25.                 A. V. Dicey, “Introduction to the Laws of Constitution”, Oxford, England, 1885. 

By Mr Jean-Paul LAWRENCE TAMPU-EYABA (Hon's) LL.B. (Hon's) LL.M. (London) PhD (Law Res.)

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[1] B.C. Smith, "Understanding Third Word Politics: Theory of Political Change and Development", Macmillan Press Ltd., 1996, p. 3

[2] Ibid.

[3] Walter Rodney, (1988), "How Europe Underdeveloped AFRICA", Bogle L'Ouverture Publications Ltd., London.

[4] Jeff Haynes, (1996), "Third World Politics: A Concise Introduction", Blackwell Plublishers Ltd., Oxford, UK, p. 26.

[5] Ditto. p. 28.

[6] Ibid. p. 27.

[7] Max Weber, "Politics as a Vocation",

[8] Susan Calvert and Peter Calvert, "Politics and Society in the Third world: An Introduction", Pentice Hall Europe, Herts., 1996, pp. 158-9. Susan Calvert et al argue that: "Legitimacy means that a government is generally recognised to have the right to do what it does…The fact that a government is recognised as legitimate gives it authority which is the assurance that its command will be obeyed…"

[9] Paul Cammack, Capitalism and Democracy in the Third World: The Doctrine for Political Development", London, Leicester University Press, 1997, pp. 146-174.

[10] Ibid., p. 157.

[11] Diamond et al (eds.), "Introduction: Comparing experiences with Democracy", in Diamond et al (eds.) Politics of Developing Countries: Comparing Experiences with Democracy, London, Lynne Rienners Publishers,1990, p. 10.

[12] Lucky Dube, "Puppet Masters" in "Trinity", Tabu, 1995.

[13] Colette Braeckmann, "Le Zaire de Mobutu: Le Dinosaur", 1991.

[14] Ditto.

[15] Thomas L. Brewer, "American Foreign Policy: A contemporary Introduction", Fourth Edition, 1997, at pp. 249-270.

[16] Walter Rodney, ibid. 149-173.

[17] Susan Calvert et al., Ibid., at 158-9.

[18] Ibid., at pp. 80-1.

[19] Ibid., p. 154.

[20] Samuel Huntington, (1968), "Political Order in Changing Societies", New Haven, Conn., Yale University Press. Huntington argues that it is very important to have order because no political society exists with chaos; and, consequently, it is very important to look for a good political system in which society should be organised with.

[21] John Alder, "Constitutional and Administrative Law", Second Edition, The Macmillan Press Ltd., 1994, at pp. 38-59.

[22] Ibid., pp. 139-213.

[23] For instance, most third world states have adopted the US, UK and French constitutions while it is obvious that the realities between the North and South are totally different. Generally speaking, any third world country has a constitution in one form or another that correspond to one of the western constitution but these constitutions are so unrealistic because they seem to be more in words than in practice as there are no effective political institutions.

[24] Ibid., pp. 139-213.

[25] O'Donnell, G. (1979), "Tensions in the Bureaucratic Authoritarian State and the Question of Democracy", in D. Collier (ed.) The New Authoritarianism in Latin America. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

[26] The Times newspaper, 16 March 1998, p. 14.

[27] Ditto.

[28] The Times, Friday May 22nd 1998, pp. 14-16.

[29] The New Congo Net, at http://www.marekinc.com

[30] See http://www.rdcongo.org

[31] Susan Calvert, Ibid., pp. 149-152.

[32] R. Sandbrook, "The Crisis in Political Development Theory", Journal of Development Studies, vol. 12, No. 2, 1976, pp. 180-1.

[33] Ibid.

[34] Thomas L. Brewer et al, Ibid., pp. 252-5.

[35] Moreover, Stephen Gill argues that the shrinking world brings a new constitutionalism, which implies that government's credibility with the international community is becoming highly important than the credibility with its citizens. Consequently, bureaucratic authoritarian system of government is really made vulnerable because the international community would obviously sanction any authoritarian government and, therefore, personalism would not attract private multi-lateral or Trans-national investments.

[36] Ditto. pp. 152-4 and pp. 202-203.

[37] Colette Braeckmann, ibid.

[38] However, although there seems to be a bond in populism, this is untrue because people do not really participate in the political system, as these regimes are only based on ideas that can lead to revolutions or post-revolutions such as those occurred in Cuba, China and Iran.

[39] Ian Mclean, "Oxford Concise Dictionary of Politics, Oxford University Press, 1996, p. 129-132.

[40] James N. Danziger, "Understanding The Political World: A Comparative Introduction to Political Science", 4th Edition, Wesley Longman, New York, US, 1998, pp. 439-443 and 463-464.

[41] L. Diamond (1988)"Introduction: Roots of Failure, Seeds of Hope", in L. Diamond, J.J. Linz and S.M. Lipset (ed.) Democracy in Developing Countries, vol. 2, Africa. Bouder: Lynne Reinner Publishers, p. 16.

[42] The Times, Friday May 22nd 1998, pp. 24-6.

[43] Ibid., p. 340.

[44] Diamond and J.J. Linz, "Introduction: Politics, Society and democracy in Latin America", in L. Diamond et al (eds.) Democracy in Developing Countries, vol. 4, Latin America, Boulder: Lynne Reinner Publishers, 1989, p. 13.

[45] Francis Fukuyama, "The End of History", National Interest, summer 1989, and "The End of History and the Last Man" (New York: The Free Press, 1992). For a more recent statement of F. Fukuyama, see "The End of Order" (London: Social Market Foundation, 1997).

[46] See Sabam, "The European Issues: Human Rights in International law", Council of Europe Publishing, Brussels, 1992. A.H. Robertson & J.G. Merrills, "Human Rights in the world: An Introduction to the study of International Protection of Human Rights", 3rd Edition, 1992. I. Brownlie, "Basic Documents in Human Rights", second edition, Oxford, 1981.

[47] http://www.marekinc.com/NCNNews.html

[48] Ibid., pp. 156-8 and 212-3.

[49] Ibid., p. 157.

[50] Paul Hirst & Grahame Thomson, (1996), "Globalisation in Question", Polity Press, Cambridge, UK, pp. 99-120.

[51] John Gray, "Global Utopias and Clashing Civilisations", International Affairs 74, I (1998) pp. 149-164, at 149-150.

[52] A. V. Dicey argues, firstly, the rule of law enshrined in the constitution means absolute supremacy of the law over arbitrary power, including the wide discretionary powers of government. Secondly, he says that every citizen is subject to the ordinary law administered by the ordinary courts. While finally, Dicey says about the rule of law that the rights in the constitution are based not upon abstract constitutional statements, but upon actual decisions of the courts.

[53] This simply means, where there is law there is a remedy.

[54] John Alder, ibid., pp. 54-8.

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