"Critically assess to what extent it is now appropriate to analyse contemporary international relations in terms of a clash of civilisations rather than a conflicts of political interests?"

By Mr Jean-Paul LAWRENCE TAMPU-EYA, BA LL.B. LL.M. PhD (Law Res.)

This essay is structured as follows: in the first part, it presents the main ideas in "The Clash of Civilisations and the Remaking of World Order", where Samuel Huntington[1] argues that it is now appropriate to analyse contemporary international relations in terms of a clash of civilisations since political and economic differences of ideologies have disappeared in the post-Cold War era. Huntington looks at all the major civilisations that existed and exist, especially ‘The West' and its adapting to a not so dominant role in the future and explains how civilisations evolve and how religious affiliations play a major role. In the second part, this essay looks at whether it is right to analyse contemporary international relations as a clash of civilisations.  Here, Huntington's thesis is criticised because, for instance, he fails to analyse the role that states, which are the most important actors in international relations, would play in his so-called 'clash of civilisations'. While looking at some scholars' criticisms, this essay argues that Huntington is suffering from 'myopia' because he was short sighted in foreseeing a "clash of civilisations" between the West and the Rest. Thirdly, Huntington's responses to the above criticisms arguments are analysed. In his response, Huntington argues "If Not Civilisations, What?"[2] because none of the criticisms provides a compelling alternative paradigm, which could explain the post-Cold War world better than his clash of civilisations? Lastly, it concludes that it is not appropriate to analyse contemporary international relations in terms of a clash of civilisations because conflicts of political interests would always remain pre-eminent. Therefore, Huntington's clash of civilisations constitutes a hallucination because states rivalries would continue to arise for the control of oil and other resources, which all involves state's political interests instead of cultural differences among peoples.    

In his 1996 "The Clash of Civilisations and the Remaking of the New World Order", Samuel Huntington explains how the conflicts between civilisations would dominate world politics.  In this book, Huntington gives a fuller explanation and responds to an article[3] he had written earlier on the same question because of the controversy created due to the articles' content. Huntington argues that the fundamental source of conflict in the post-Cold War world would neither be ideological nor economical but it would be cultural. The clash of civilisations, which is the next pattern of conflicts, will dominate global politics. States would remain the main actors but the battle lines between different civilisations will dominate future conflicts in modern world. The Clash of Civilisations is a product of a historic development. Different forms of struggle within Western civilisation occurred since early modern Europe, i.e. "Western civil War". For instance, the French revolution characterised principally the struggle between nations and nationalism, while the Russian revolution resulted in a clash of ideologies between communism, fascism, liberal democracy and free markets. The end of the Cold War will see another phase of world conflicts involving the West and non-Westerners that will not only be the recipients of Western policy but the new movers and shapers of world history.

Nowadays, since the Cold War's divisions of the world the First, Second and Third world are no longer relevant, conflicts will therefore change from political and economic ideologies toward the cultural, which implies civilisational identity that may spread both across national and state borders. Huntington argues that civilisations will clash because its identity will be very important in the future. Civilisations that will shape the world are 'Western, Confucian, Japanese, Islamic, Hindu, Slavic-Orthodox, Latin American, and possibly African'.[4] Conflicts are likely to arise between people of different civilisations because, first, differences between civilisations, i.e. relationship between God and people, individual and state, man and woman, notions of obligations, authority, rights and justice are far deeper since they are the product of centuries that will not disappear soon. This is because culture is not an artificial constructive belief such as nationalism or communism but it comes from a long historic construction. Second, as the world is getting smaller in today's globalisation, migrations and increasing interactions of peoples of different civilisations, intensify civilisation consciousness and awareness, which explains that the clash of civilisations is more likely to happen. Third, economic modernisation and social changes are detaching people from their royal local standing and this is therefore weakening the state by creating a vacuum of identity and loyalty that sees ethnic and religion, labelled as fundamentalism, step in to fill the gap. Fourth, although the West seems to be at the height, most Western ideologies such as nationalism and socialism have failed and they are now giving way to "re-Islamisation", "Asianisation", "Hinduisation", and "Russianisation". In many non-western countries, a de-Westernisation and indigenisation of elites are happening; while, meanwhile, Western culture that are usually US led cultures, music, styles, films and habits are becoming more popular all over the world.

Fifth, as people can easily change their nationalities and rich nations or people can become poor, cultural characteristics and differences are 'less mutable' since they are more discriminatory than economic and political ideologies. For instance, it is almost impossible to be half-Catholic and half-Muslim as it the case with dual nationalities. The then Cold War question "What side are you on?" changes today to "What are you?" and a wrong answer to this question can result in a bullet in the head. Lastly, regionalism, based on common culture and religion, is increasing. This results in cultural consciousness in which people see themselves as "us" versus "them" because "differences in culture and religion create differences over policies such as the protection of Human Rights, trade, democracy, immigration, environment and commerce. Common culture like the one shared by Western European nations in the European Union is facilitating their rapid expansion of political and economic success. Besides, NAFTA's success rests on the convergence that is underway between Mexico, Canada and the US. Thus, clash of civilisations would happen in two levels: firstly, in a struggle over resources across a series of territorial 'fault lines between civilisations'. Lastly, in more general for influences and capabilities in international level, and particularly over international institutions, organisations and norms.

As the flash point of crisis and bloodshed, the fault lines between Civilisations are now replacing the political and ideological boundaries of the Cold War era. The end of Cold War saw the "Iron Curtain", dividing Europe politically and ideologically, being replaced by the "Velvet Curtain" of culture. The great historic fault lines that exist among civilisations are aflame because, for example, conflicts along the fault line between Islam and the West exist since the seventh century and along the boundaries of crescent-shaped Islamic bloc states from Africa to central Asia, "Islam has bloody borders"[5].  In the Civilisation Rallying or The Kin-Country syndrome, Huntington looks at the Gulf War and Bosnia where he says that the principal basis for coalitions and co-operation is civilisation's commonality, called the "Kin-Country"[6] syndrome. This is replacing the political ideologies and traditional balance of power. In this world of clashing civilisations, there is a paramount principle of double standard, which means that people take favourable and supporting standard to their kin-countries while a different one to others. Future local conflicts would possibly result into major wars, which would be along the fault lines of civilisations as it was in Bosnia. Therefore, if there would be a third World War, it will be on the fault lines of civilisations. In the post-Cold War, the major dynamic of the competition in the world will be dominated between the "West", as the dominant civilisation, and to some degrees the "Rest". Western military power and domination of the IMF, World Bank and other international institutions like the UN give them political and economic abilities. The West uses the very phrase "world community" to legitimise their actions and values throughout the whole world. Nevertheless, Western liberal ideas of democracy, rule of law, Human Rights, free markets, liberalism and so forth have really little resonance in non-western cultures such as Islamic, Japanese, Confucian, Hindu, Orthodox or Buddhist cultures, which implies that future conflict will be between "the West and the Rest".[7]  

Huntington puts that Countries that have a fair degree of cultural homogeneity but that are divided over whether they belong to one civilisation or another are 'Torn Countries'. These are, for instance Turkey, Mexico, Russia, which leaders try to join Western principles in order to make their countries part of the West while their history, traditions and culture are totally non-western. 

Since the Cold War was over the West is reducing its military capabilities but non-western countries, i.e. Confucian-Islamic connection such as China, North Korea and several Middle Eastern states are all becoming "Weapon States"[8]. These states are significantly trying to expend their military capabilities by importing arms from the West and other countries and also developing their own indigenous arms industries. The desire for this Confucian-Islamic military connection is to acquire weapons and weapons' technologies that would allow them to challenge western powers, interests and values. Briefly, Huntington's thesis is that "culture and cultural identities, which at the broadest level are civilisation identities, are shaping the patterns of cohesion, disintegration, and conflict in the post-Cold War world...in this new world, local politics is the politics of ethnicity; global politics is the politics of civilisations. The rivalry of superpowers is replaced by the clash of civilisations"[9]. Huntington advises western people to hang together or most surely, they will hang separately since the clash of civilisations is the greatest threat to international peace and security. He sees that the next global pattern of conflicts will be a reversion of the old western "civil wars" because it will be on the old cultural formations, called civilisations. In his reckoning, Islam is one of the eight civilisations, which resurgence is a threat to international stability, because the division between Islam and the West is the oldest cultural fault-line in the world that is marked by conflict for over 1, 300 years. 

Therefore, "A West at its peak of power confronts non-West's countries that increasingly have the desire, the will and the resources to shape the world in non-western ways". Consequently, future conflicts would be between "the West and the rest", which involves the west and the Muslims, the west and an Islamic-Confucian alliance, or the west and a collection of other civilisations, i.e. Hindu, Japanese, Latin American, and Slavic-Orthodox.

Huntington argues that there is a civilisational paradigm since:

"...Many important developments after the end of the Cold War were compatible with the civilisational paradigm and could have been predicted from it. These include: the break up of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia; the wars going on in their former territories; the rise of religious fundamentalism throughout the world; the struggles within Russia, Turkey, and Mexico over their identity; the intensity of the trade conflicts between the United states and Japan; the resistance of Islamic states to western pressure on Iraq and Libya; the efforts of Islamic and Confucian states to acquire nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them; China's continuing role as an "outsider" great power; the consolidation of new democratic regimes in some countries and not in others; and the developing arms and competition in East Asia".[10]

In brief, Huntington argues, in today new world, local politics is therefore the politics of ethnicity; while global politics is the politics of civilisations. The rivalry of Cold War superpowers is replaced by the clash of civilisations. He concludes his book with an incredible but believable scenario in which Europe, Russia, India and US become involved in a war of global proportions against China, Japan, and the majority of Islam.  In order to avoid such a scenario, he suggests a search for ‘common goals, values, and objectives' is very important.

However, Huntington's theory appears to be wrong since it does not seem appropriate to analyse contemporary international relations in terms of a clash of civilisations because conflicts involving state's interests would continue to dominate world's politics. This is since despite his obligatory passage that states will remain "the most powerful actors in world's affairs", Huntington seems to write off nation states in his thesis and it appears that their place are given over to clash of civilisations. This is, for example, when Huntington asserts, "The next world war, if there is one will be a war between civilisations". Hence, Fouad Ajami seems right to argue that there will not be any clash of civilisations because:

"...Civilisations do not control states, states control civilisations. States avert their gaze from blood ties when they need to; they see brotherhood and faith and kin when it is in their interest to do so"[11].

Mr Ajami agrees with Kenichi Ohmae[12] that it is not appropriate to analyse contemporary international relations in terms of nations' battle for civilisational fidelities and ties. States would rather struggle for their interests in world's market shares by competing in the global economy in order to provide jobs, stability, security and move the people out of poverty, as people want Sony, not soil[13]. Contrary to what Huntington says, it seems instead that in the post-Cold War conflicts of political and economic interests among world's major nations are becoming more and more common tense. Therefore, Liu Binyan[14] is right to emphasise that 'Neither civilisations nor culture has become the "fundamental source of conflict in this New World"'.[15] It appears right to say that Huntington's presentation of contemporary international system as 'the West v. the Rest'[16] creates a big risk of making "daily" manageable conflicts very difficult to solve. John Gray[17] attacks Huntington when he emphasises that:

"...Viewing the world today through the lens of apocalyptic beliefs about...'the West versus the rest' conceals these universal and perennial conflicts. It encourages the hope that the difficult choices and unpleasant trade-offs that have always been necessary in the relations of states will someday be redundant. For that hope there is no rational warrant[18]. 

Since Huntington's main concerns are in Western power and terms of engagement with "the rest", Fouad Ajami stresses however that Huntington failed to analyse the West itself, as no fissures run through it in his entire essay. There are no sign of multiculturalism since Huntington has kept himself within specific walls while hoping that his call for Western unity against the rest will be replied[19]. In attacking Huntington's thesis as dangerous, Mr Gray asserts that:

"...Differing cultural traditions are surely among the sources of international conflict today; by themselves, however, they rarely lead to major conflicts between states. It is their interactions with scarcities of resources, rival claims on territory, conflicting agendas on trade and historic memories of ethnic or religious enmity that make cultural differences a source of war. Thinking of international conflicts as clashes of civilisations involves a grand and dangerous simplification of these complicated and often obscure interactions..."[20].

Huntington's thesis is not right because nation-states compete by using all means to achieve their political interests and, it seems that in this process, cultural differences do not play any major part. States' power involves national interests, as in international relations, states seek to maximise their power in order to achieve political interests[21]. For example, the British government's decision to rule out Euro for this Parliament term, which Gordon Brown, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, stated was in the British national interest. While agreeing with Fouad Ajami[22], Kramer Martin[23] adds that each state makes a separate calculation of its political interests as it scrambles for a right position in the world affairs and place in the global economy. The Chinese claim of being neutral and leader of third world states during the Cold War was a way that China used to balance East-West relations for their own political interests. Nowadays, in post-Cold War, China appears to change its position towards the US. This illustrates that Chinese political interests are really important in international relations.

John Gray[24] argues that Huntington's theory is false since, in international relations, conflicts do not come from the 'clashes of civilisations' but they arise from the conflicting interests and the policies of states involved in achieving them. In today's post-Cold War period as it was in the past, conflicts and wars are commonly waged between and within nationalities and ethnicities, i.e. between people of the same civilisations, but not between different civilisations. For instance, recent Indian nuclear tests resulted in a fierce response by Pakistan even though the whole world was not happy for the test. Although India and Pakistan share some history and other backgrounds and are included in Huntington's group of 'the Rest', Pakistani authorities are angered because they know that their territory is the only place where India will, at the end, use its nuclear bombs and missiles. This brought Pakistan to announce that it is ready to conduct its nuclear tests as well in order to avoid being blackmailed by India[25]. CNN reported on May 24^th 1998 that Pakistan's Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif has warned India's nuclear tests as a threat to his country's national security and therefore it would not be tolerated. As provocation over Kashmir was a concern, he said the tests had cast a 'dark shadow' over the entire region and he stated 'Any misadventure would be met with a resolute response'. The war between Iran and Iraq; Rwandan genocide, where Hutus killed around one million Tutsis; Pol Pot's genocide in Cambodia; both World Wars; Northern Ireland conflict, ETA separatists in Spain, Indonesian annexation of East Timor etc. illustrate that many world's brutal conflicts take place within the people of same 'civilisations'.

Moreover, Huntington's Kin-country syndrome carries some doubt because members of different ‘civilisations' can also act for a common cause involving their political interests, as it was in the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict, where Iran helped Christian Armenia instead of Islamic Azerbaijan with whom they share Huntington's common Islamic culture[26]. Further:

"...The battle lines in the Caucasus...are not coextensive with civilisational fault lines. The lines follow the interests of states. Where Huntington sees a civilisational duel between Armenia and Azerbaijan, the Iranian has cast religious zeal and fidelity to the wind. Indeed, in that battle the Iranians have titled toward Christian Armenian."[27]

In addition, the struggle against apartheid in South Africa did not involve only black Africans but also people of other civilisations including whites who are in Western civilisations. For instance, Joe Slovo, a "White Zulu", is well known for his expressed views against apartheid although he was white and apartheid ended after the West passed sanctions against the brutal white minority government of the then South Africa. This example applies as well for slavery, as there are also some whites who thought it alongside blacks.       

Huntington's thesis creates big problems, as his typology of civilisations cannot explain the world's conflicts in these twentieth and future centuries because it represents "an imprecise, even arbitrary taxonomy"[28]. While enumerating his major six or nine civilisations that will shape the world, Huntington is not confident with his listings because he seems to have some doubt as to where Latin America should be put. Moreover, after hesitating, he says that Jews are part of 'Western civilisation', while excluding Greece[29]. For this reason, Huntington appears to base his criterion for identifying civilisations on artefact of US multiculturalism because he bases a community or a culture qualification on whether it has established itself as a minority in the US, as otherwise it does not. While urging Western peoples to hang together or most assuredly, they will hang separately, Huntington ignores that Western people are not as easy to identify as he thinks because of all Eat-West division that existed during the Cold War[30]. Hence, it seems also that Huntington does not see culture as an extended family of cultural traditions and customs that has endured for centuries in a society but he keeps on looking at Western culture in a Cold War construction.   

Fouad Ajami[31] asks, "...Where is the Confucian world Huntington speaks of?" because the Confucian-Islamic connection, which Huntington refers to does not exist. A Chinese leading dissident, Liu Binyan[32], points out that it is really ironic that Huntington sees a resurgent Confucianism at the very time when spiritual deterioration and moral degradation are already eroding China and its cultural foundations. Martin Kramer[33] attacks Huntington's thesis because Islam, for example, has already joined "The end of History"[34] by embracing Western values since Islam is no longer intact as a civilisation and the real fault lines of conflict already run through its very core. As Francis Fukuyama[35] argues, liberal democracy has remained the only kind of responsible government in the globe; and, therefore, this Confucian-Islamic "would seem more vulnerable to liberal ideas in the long run than the reverse"[36]. Fouad Ajami says that Huntington underestimates the tenacity of modernity and secularism because India, for example, will not become a Hindu state since the inheritance of secularism existing in Indian middle class will hold and defend it in order to maintain their countries' place in the world's family of democratic nations. Jeane Kirkpatrick[37] argues that the steady drumbeat of modernisation, which is occurring in this time of globalisation, will likely force civilisations to change and reform. In Islam, for instance, secularism and modernity have already taken firm hold and, therefore, the "thrashing about" in the name of Islamic religion 'must not be mistaken for the vitality of a battered tradition'[38]. The world of Islam divides and subdivides within itself and the battle lines, in the Caucasus, for instance do not seem to be coextensive with the fault lines of civilisations but instead the lines follow state's interests[39]. Huntington referred to the Gulf war while mentioning that Islam has bloody borders. However, it appears that Huntington has simply bought Saddam Hussein's interpretation of the Persian conflict as a civilisational battle. Egyptian religious leading figure, the Shaykh of Al Ashar, Shaykh Jadd al Haqq and others, for example, denounced Iraqi Saddam Hussein as a tyrant by brushing aside his Islamic pretensions as a cover for tyranny[40]. In addition, it was a coalition of Muslim, Western, and other nations liberated Kuwait, a Muslim country, from Iraq, another Muslim State[41]. Kishore Mahbubani[42] analysis shows that the West is suffering from paranoia since the Islamic activists bombed the World Trade Centre. Although Huntington's "Islam has bloody borders" argument seems to imply that Islam represents a threat to the West, it does not carry enough weight to replace the Cold War rivalries because in any conflict between Muslims and pro-westerns forces, i.e. from Azeris, Palestine, Iraq, Iran, Bosnia, etc. Muslims are always loosing and they are loosing badly. In stating that the clash of civilisations will involve the West and Rest who may become the movers and shapers of history, Huntington's is simply ‘stereotyping'[43] the Rest. As in a recent Islamic conference, Iranian President Mohamed Kathami urged Muslims to start taking some western and other people's civilisational values into accounts. Moreover, on the first anniversary his landslide election victory, Iran's reformer President Khatami defended the right of the opposition to be heard. Iran radio reported that Khatami told supporters on a Tehran mass march that "when we speak of freedom we mean the freedom of the opposition...the people have the right within the framework of the law, to expect their freedoms from the government"[44]. All this shows that history has ended with the triumph of Western ideas of individual freedoms, democracy, rule of law, respect of human rights and free markets[45].

In response to the above criticisms on his "clash of civilisations" paradigm, Huntington readily reacts "If Not Civilisations, What?"[46] He says, the responses to his civilisational paradigm did not provide any compelling alternative paradigm, which could explain the post-Cold War world. Their suggestions are both pseudo-alternative and unreal. Firstly, Huntington attacks Fouad Ajami's argument that "civilisations do not control states, states control civilisations" as being a pseudo-alternative because it is a statist paradigm that constructs a completely artificial and irrelevant opposition between civilisations and states. He says that it is meaningless to mention civilisations and states in term of 'control' because:

'...We do not live in a world of countries characterised by the "solitude of states" (to use Ajami's phrase) with no connections between them. Our world is one of overlapping groupings of states brought together in varying degrees by history, culture, religion, language, location and institutions. At the broadest level, these groupings are civilisations. To deny their existence is to deny the basic realities of human existence...'[47]

Secondly, Huntington explains that it is an unreal alternative, in the one-world paradigm, to say that there is an emerging universal civilisation or culture either now or in the future. Francis Fukuyama's argument, for instance, stating that the break up of Soviet Union indicates the end of history and the universal spread of democracy and other western liberal ideas suffers from the Single Alternative Fallacy. This comes from the Cold War argument that the adoption of liberal democracy is the only alternative to communist states and therefore the destruction of the first produces the universality of western liberal ideas. Since, there are still despotic, kleptocratic, nationalist, market communism (China) and corporatism governments in the world; therefore, this end of history idea fails to analyse basic differences in world's religions and cultures, which would result in a clash of civilisations. The assumption that modernisation and economic development's homogenisation effect by producing a common modern culture is wrong because "modernisation does not equal modernisation", as Singapore, Saudi Arabia, Malaysia and Japan are prosperous and modern states but they are still obviously non-Western. Hence, Western thought that the 'Rest' has to become like 'us' is mostly an arrogance that in itself represents the clash of civilisations, as it is stated above.       

The world appears to be at odds and civilisations seem to be the responsible for these conflicts. The civilisational paradigm has struck a responsive chord all over the world since he mentions, firstly, Vaclav Havel who supported his thesis by observing that "civilisations conflicts...are increasing and are more and more dangerous today than at any time in history"[48]. Secondly, he says that the former EU President Jacques Delors agreed that:

"...Future conflicts will be sparked by cultural factors rather than economics or ideology..." and advised that "...The West needs to develop a deeper understanding of the religious and philosophical assumptions underlying other civilisations, and the way other nations see their interests, to identify what we have in common..." 

Huntington asserts that Muslims have agreed with his clash of civilisations since it shows the recognition of cultural differences and independence between the West and the Rest. He concludes:

'...History has not ended. The world is not one. Civilisations unite and divide humankind. The forces making for clashes of civilisations between civilisations can be contained only if they are recognised. In a "world of different civilisations" ... each "will have to learn to live with the others". What ultimately counts for people is not political ideology or economic interest. Faith and family, blood and belief, are what people identify with and what they will fight and die for. And that is why the clash of civilisation is replacing the Cold war as the central phenomenon of global politics, and why a civilisational paradigm provides, better than any other alternative, a useful starting point for understanding and coping with the changes going on in the world'[49]. 

Before concluding, it seems right to suggest that today's growth of global markets would reflect cultural differences because the world is not being united by only one single political or economic civilisation but it has plural civilisations. Therefore, some political and economic rivalries would be the result of such cultural differences but, contrary to Huntington's 'myopia', this does not mean that the world would be divided up into some well defined, static cultures and there would not be a clash of civilisations. Civilisations are in this world to enrich each other, as in the emergence of genuine world markets in many economic life areas; therefore, continuing civilisations' interactions are an irreversible global condition. However, it appears that in the political and economic rivalries of future centuries, cultural differences will be vital. However, contrary to Huntington's thesis, this does not mean that the world will be split up into well specified and static civilisations since continuing cultural interactions in this time of globalisation is already undermining people's cultures and none of these remains immutable. As John Gray emphasises:

"...Neither economic rivalries nor military conflicts can be understood when viewed through the distorting lens of civilisational conflict. Talking of clashing civilisations is supremely unsuited to a time when cultures - not least the extended family of peoples that Huntington loosely terms 'the West' - are in flux. In so far as such talk shapes the thinking of policy-makers it risks making cultural differences what they have only been rarely in the past - causes of war."[50] 

In conclusion, it does not appear to be appropriate to analyse contemporary international relations in terms of a clash of civilisations because conflicts of political interests would always remain very important in world's affairs. Therefore Huntington's clash of civilisations is a hallucination because states rivalries arise for the control of oil and other resources, which all involves state's political interests instead of cultural differences among peoples. The world-wide spread of multi-national industries, the end of Western global hegemony and others are new but the conflicts over territory, religion and commercial advantage between sovereign states are not new at all. Briefly, cultural differences among the peoples are not appropriate to be the base of analysis in contemporary international relations because great power rivalries for the control of oil and other resources that all involve nation-states' interests are likely to pose the most enduring risks to international peace and security. 

Bibliography

Huntington, S. P. (1996), "The Clashes of Civilisations and the Remaking of World Order" (New York, Simon & Schuster).

Huntington, S. "The Clash of Civilisations?", Foreign Affairs, Summer 1993, pp. 22-49.

Huntington, S. P. "The West Unique, not Universal", Foreign Affairs, vol. 75, 6, (March-April) pp. 28-46.

Ikenberry, G.J. et al, "The West: Precious, Not Unique: Civilisations Make for Poor Paradigm', Foreign Affairs, 76, 2, pp. 162-165.

Gray, John "Global Utopias and Clashing of Civilisations: Misunderstanding the Present", International Affairs, vol. 74. I (1998) 149-164.

Ajami, Fouad, "The Summoning", Foreign affairs, September/ October 1993, pp. 2-9.

Mahbulani, Fouad "The Dangers of Decadence: What the Rest Can Teach the West", Foreign Affairs, vol. 72, No. 4, Sept/Oct 1993, pp. 10-14.

Bartley, Robert L.  "The Case of Optimism: The West Should Believe in Itself", Foreign Affairs, vol. 72, No. 4, pp. 15-18.

Binya, Robert L. "Civilisation Grafting: No Culture is an Island", Foreign Affairs, vol. 72, No. 4, pp. 19-21.

Kirkpatrick, Jeane et al, "The Modernising Imperative: Tradition and Change", Foreign Affairs, vol. 72, No. 4, pp. 2226.

Kramer, Martin (1996), "Arab Awakening & Islamic Revival: The Politics of Ideas in the Middle East", Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick (USA) & London (UK).

Sun newspaper, 18.05.1998.

Viotti, Paul R. (1993), "International Relations Theory: Realism, Pluralism, Globalism", 2nd Edition, McMillan Publishing Company, 1993, pp. 5-7.

This work (essay/article) was written by:

Mr Jean-Paul LAWRENCE TAMPU-EYA, PhD (Res.), BA(Hon's), LL.B.(Hon's), LL.M. (London)

CARA - Charity Reg. No. 1135610 - Company Reg. No. 06673504 - HMRC No.: XT12788 - ICO No.: Z154587X
Registered Office Address: 18 - 22 Ashwin Street, Dalston, Hackney, London E8 3DL United Kingdom (UK)
Tel: +44 (0) 844 478 0015 - Mob: +44 (0) 795 695 2645 - Fax: +44 (0) 872 115 8436 - E-mail: info@cara-online.org - Website: http://www.cara-online.org/

Copyright © October 2007

Designed and typeset by

Plefilia, Plenty, Plevinas & Plemilia Tampwhuo-Eyab  & Co.

41, Tower Court, Stamford Hill, London E5 (UK)
 

[1]Samuel P. Huntington, (1996), "The Clash of Civilisations and the Remaking of World Order", London, Touchstone Books.

[2] Samuel P. Huntington, "Response: If Not Civilisations, What? (Paradigm of the Post-Cold War World)", Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, no. 5, November/December, 1993, pp. 186-194. See also Samuel P. Huntington, (1996), ibid.  

[3] S. Huntington, "The Clash of Civilisations", Foreign Affairs, summer 1993.

[4] Huntington (1993), ibid. p. 25.

[5] S. Huntington, (1993), ibid., p. 35.

[6] Huntington refers to H.D. Greenery, ibid. p. 35.

[7] Ibid., p. 41.

[8] Here Huntington agrees with Charles Krauthammer, ibid. p. 45-8.

[9] Huntington (1996), ibid., p. 20-8.

[10] Samuel P. Huntington, (1996), ibid., pp. 37-8.

[11] Fouad Ajami., p. 9.

[12] Kenichi Ohmae, Global Consumers Want Sony, Not Soil", New Perspectives Quarterly, Fall 1991.

[13] Ditto. See also Fouad Ajami, ibid., p. 5.

[14] Liu Binyan, ibid., p. 19.

[15] Ditto.

[16] S. P. Huntington, "The West Unique, not Universal", Foreign Affairs, vol. 75, 6, (March-April) pp. 28-46.

[17] John Gray, "Global Utopias and Clashing of Civilisations: Misunderstanding the Present" in International Affairs, vol. 74. I (1998) 149-164.

[18] Ibid., p. 162.

[19] Fouad Ajami, ibid., p. 3.

[20] Ibid., at p. 151.

[21] Paul R. Viotti, "International Relations Theory: Realism, Pluralism, Globalism", 2nd Edition, McMillan Publishing Company, 1993, pp. 5-7.

[22] Ditto.

[23] Martin Kramer (1996), "Arab Awakening & Islamic Revival: The Politics of Ideas in the Middle East", Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick (USA) & London (UK).

[24] John Gray, ibid.

[25] Sun newspaper, 18.05.1998, p. 3.

[26] Fouad Ajami, ibid., p. 9.

[27] Fouad Ajami, ibid., p. 9.

[28] Ibid., p. 157.

[29] Ditto.

[30] Ditto.

[31] Fouad Ajami, "The Summoning", Foreign Affairs, vol. 72, No. 4, Sept/Oct 1993, pp. 2-9.

[32] Liu Binyan, "Civilisation Grafting: No Culture Is an Island", Foreign Affairs, vol. 72, No. 4, pp. 19-21, at p. 21.

[33] Ditto., p. 283.

[34] See Francis Fukuyama in his "The End of History and the Last Man" (New York: Free Press, 1992), 46.

[35] Francis Fukuyama, "The End of History and the Last Man", 1992, pp. 45-6.

[36] Ditto.

[37] See Jeane T. Kirkpatrick et al, "The Modernising Imperative: Tradition and Change", Foreign affairs, vol. 72, No. 4, pp. 22-26, at p. 24.

[38] Ibid., p. 283.

[39] Fouad Ajami, ibid., p. 9.

[40] Ibid., p. 8.

[41] As Huntington identifies himself, in the Persian Gulf War, "one Arab State invaded another and then fought a coalition of Arab, Western and other states". See Jeane T. Kirkpatrick et al, ibid., at p. 25.

[42] Kishore Mahbubani, "The Dangers of Decadence: What the Rest Can Teach the West", Foreign Affairs, vol. 72, Sept/Oct 1993, vol. 4, pp.10-14, at 12.

[43] Edward Said, "Orientalism: Western Conception of the Orient" (London: Penguin, 1995).

[44] CNN and BBC World News, May 24^th 1998.

[45] Francis Fukuyama, ibid.

[46] Samuel P. Huntington, "Response: If Not Civilisations, What? (Paradigm of the Post-Cold War World)", Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, no. 5, November/December, 1993, pp. 186-194. See also Samuel P. Huntington, (1996), "The Clash of Civilisations and the Remaking of World Order", London, Touchstone Books. 

[47] Huntington Response, ibid., p. 191.

[48] Huntington (1996), ibid., p. 28.

[49] Ibid., at p. 194.

[50] John Gray, ibid., p. 159.