Clausewitz's "On War"

"On War"

'Critically Assess the Merits and Defects of Clausewitz's Uncompleted Study'

By Mr Jean-Paul LAWRENCE TAMPU-EYA, BA LL.B. LL.M. PhD (Law Res.)

Karl Marie Von Clausewitz (1780-1831) was a Prussian soldier, military theorist and writer. This essay critically assesses the merits and defects of Clausewitz's famous uncompleted study "On War", published by his wife after his death, which has had and continues to have a major influence on strategy in today's conduct of warfare. It essay is structured as follows: In the first part, it looks solely at the merits of Clausewitz's study "On War", e.g. the dual nature of war, the definition of war as the continuation of politics, his theory of the centre of gravity and friction. While in the second part, it analyses the defects that come from the fact that he did not, for instance, mention maritime power in war, the role of women in warfare, arms race and his list of the centre of gravity seems also uncompleted. In conclusion, although there are many merits and defects, this work argues that Clausewitz's definition of war and his theories like the centre of gravity and friction, made him one of the greatest masters and makers of war.[1]    

As James Adams[2] says, all military thinkers and planners turn mainly to both Clausewitz and Sun Tzu for basic guidance on military affairs. Therefore, many scholars[3] give much credit to Clausewitz whom they look at as a Great War thinker whose superiority resides in the intelligent way in which he explained, elucidated and created the concepts of war in his uncompleted book "On War".[4] In his 1827 introductory note, Clausewitz explained clearly that he had completed only six books and the seventh and eight were still only rough drafts and that he planned to revise the whole book when he would finish writing. However, he died after revising only the first Chapter of Book One that introduced the three elements of his theory, i.e. the intrinsic violence of war; the dominant role of rational policy in the shaping and controlling of war; and the very important dimension that chance can play in war.[5] However, Clausewitz should be praised for his aim to bring out two great themes, which are, firstly, the "dual nature" of war that can either be "total war", i.e. when used as an instrument to overthrow the enemy or "limited war" when force is used to get concessions. Hence, war is not discrete activities since it constitutes the expression of state policy, which is implemented by other means and since states change their nature, this result in their policies and ways of fighting wars being changed.[6] Total war can be seen, for instance, with most wars fought by Israel in the Middle East and these were total wars because Israel could have ceased to exist once defeated by Arabs[7]. While today's war going on in Sierra Leone can be said to be limited since rebels are vowing for a concession from the Kabbah's government by making it clear that they would stop fighting if their leader Foday Sankoh is released.[8] Secondly, Clausewitz[9] points out clearly that war is simply the continuation of policy by other means since it has always to have a political aim and purpose; if not, it is simply nonsense violence. He assets that war is:

" War is a mere continuation of policy by other means...War is not merely a political act, but also a real political instrument, a continuation of political commerce, a carrying out of the same by other means...War is the means, and the means must always include the object in our conception."[10]

As Clausewitz himself warned, these two above themes are very important because if kept in mind throughout the whole reading of "On War", his book will be understood easily.[11]

Kalvi J. Holsti[12] gives credit to Clausewitz's vision of war as the continuation of politics by other means since he believes that war and politics go hand in hand.[13] As the recent UK and US Desert Fox bombings of Iraq as a way of enforcing UN Resolutions[14] illustrate[15], the probability of using force is one of the main ways policy-makers use to enforce their policies once they fail to defend, extend or achieve certain political objectives through peaceful means.[16] Furthermore, since Clausewitz said that people fighting must take "war seriously", Samuel B. Payne, Jr.[17] accepts him, as the thinker who gave the best alternative to war since the acknowledgement of war's cruelty and destructiveness, which necessarily make a country to be well prepared for war if it has to maintain its sovereignty is a very important advise.[18] The recent wars going on in Congo (Zaire), Congo (Brazzaville), Angola and Sierra Leone are mainly caused by the fact that these countries do not have well prepared armies that can defend their sovereignty. War is dangerous since, even though it can be exciting, it involves tremendous killings and suffering; but this awareness of war's tragedy combined with its necessity are the main reasons "On War" is 'the most important book on the subject ever written'[19] for over 150 years since its first publication. Therefore, it would be wrong to say that nuclear weapons had made "On War" redundant, as the main way of preventing nuclear war is to be prepared to retaliate to any attack by such weapons as long as the balance of terror prevails. [20]

Clausewitz is admired for the analysis he had done after studying what made French to win wars. Firstly, he saw that French politicians disregarded and broke all political and socio-economic barriers in order to win war. Secondly, men power were not the wholly trained soldiers but relied more in nationalised Frenchmen; thirdly, if France goes to war, it is the whole French nation in arms, i.e. "la nation Francaise en armes". Fourthly, he remarked from the French experience that war broke and loosened all elementary theory with everyone's participation; and, finally, once socio-psychological barriers are broken or distorted, they cannot be restored. Clausewitz shows that the linkage existing between overall national policy and waging war was not lost, as the colossal weight of the whole French people, unhinged by political fanaticism that came crashing down on us since war was simply the continuation of politics by other means.[21] From his studies, he distinguished three main ways of fighting war, which involve, firstly, practicality; secondly, memoirs and narratives of greater generals but he considered this to be unreliable. Finally, he said that those who thought that war involves natural science that is quantifiable are wrong because any military activity is an art, which cannot be a quantifiable science. Clausewitz observed also that people's passion would make them fight because their leader has shown them for instance that their enemy is evil and this will lead to the democratisation of war that may result in total war. However, democratising the war is very dangerous since it makes peaceful settlement very difficult to achieve. For example, in describing all rebels fighting his regime as Rwandan and Ugandan invaders, the DR Congo President Kabila has successfully democratised the war and this has made peaceful settlement very difficult to be achieved with the rebels who control the east and north-west of the country. Furthermore, Clausewitz is praised for saying that "defense is easier than attack"[22] since the defender can dig in and use the land to conceal and protect his forces, while the attacker has a disadvantage since he has to expose his forces while moving them forward.

Clausewitz's Book Three, which defines strategy as "the use of the engagement for the purposes of war" is much more applauded.[23] This is because Clausewitz argues here that "the best strategy is to be very strong: first everywhere, and then at the decisive point"[24] and this became the doctrine upon which many war writers based their research on. After giving him credit for saying that war is merely the continuation of politics by other means, Lawrence Freedman[25] asserts that Clausewitz key concepts like "friction" and "the centre of gravity" are still playing a major role in war today.[26] Friction makes Clausewitz[27] a respected thinker because it is still seen as the fundamental difficulty facing any quantitative approach to war and conflicts studies because any uncontrollable factor involving uncertainty is seen as friction since it would make war very difficult. This involves things like bad whether, snow, rain, and so forth make natural movement difficult to be performed. For example:

"...Fog prevents the enemy from being discovered in time, a battery from firing at the right moment, a report from reaching the General; there the rain prevents a battalion from arriving at the right time, because instead of for three days it had to march perhaps eight hours; the cavalry from charging effectively because it is stuck fast in heavy ground..."[28]

For this reason, war is a reality that has to be distinguished from the abstract training and plans that make everything to appear simple; since, the simplest thing in war is made difficult by friction that no man who has not experienced war can imagine.[29] Hence, Samuel B. Payne, Jr[30] considers "friction" as an important concept since battalions may arrive later than the time ordered; they may not be fully strengthened and when it comes to attacking, some advance while others hide and drop out. Those who attack may also find that the enemy is not where they thought he was but in another place for instance. Therefore, friction is seen as the only thing that in general way 'distinguishes real war from war on paper'[31] since it straight away undermines any previous plan or training that was made or done before war from being properly implemented. This is since it 'makes that which appears easy in War difficult in reality."[32] From this, Clausewitz rightly advises that friction may be overcome with is 'the habituation of an Army to war'[33] since habits will strengthen soldiers.

Raymond Aron[34] agrees with Liddell Hart that no person should fail to attribute merit to Clausewitz for introducing into military theory the concept of morale or moral forces. As, since all wars are subject to friction, morale is the most important factor but it is a quality not a quantity because morale plays an important role in warfare and, consequently, war can be won from moral force rather than physical strength. Clausewitz is acclaimed for examining moral forces in many chapters of his book and, therefore, stressing that war is the trial of moral and physical forces by the means of the latter. Further, he is praised for saying that although information plays a tremendous role, it has to be known that friction makes any information uncertain. That is why there should be an unpredictable reaction of the other side and since all wars are unpredictable, there is a need for high moral forces. John Strawson[35] gives credit to Clausewitz when he analysed what made Hitler's occupation of Poland, Belgium, Luxembourg, Holland and France much easier during World War II. He shows that people of these countries lost their moral and their material resources became exhausted to the point where they were no longer able to wage war against Germans. For this reason, Mr Strawson congratulates Clausewitz's "On War" that has had and even continues to have a major influence in the study of war.[36] 

In addition, Clausewitz is applauded for giving the strategy from which the enemy can be conquered in order to win war when he stated that the aim of war is to defeat the enemy. The end is the 'destruction of the enemy's military power since this has to be destroyed and reduced to a state that would not allow him to pursue the war any further and the only means he saw in War was the battle. Further:

"...What the theorist has to say here is this: one must keep the dominant characteristics of both belligerents in mind. Out of those characteristics a certain centre of gravity develops, the hub of all power and movement, on which everything depends. That is the point at which all our energies should be directed."[37]

More importantly, Clausewitz is praised for bringing in the above concept of the enemy's centre of gravity that has to be identified, kept in mind and all forces have to be used to hit it if winning the war has to be made much easier. The centre of gravity, in his view, comprises, firstly, the army of the opponent; secondly, his capital city; and thirdly, the army of the opponent's allies if he has one. As these would be vulnerable to attack, Clausewitz affirms:

"...The defeat and destruction of his fighting force remains the best way to begin, and will in any case be very significant feature of the campaign..."[38]

Therefore, this is ideal strategy of identifying the centre of gravity put together with the best technique of being stronger and superior in general and at specific decisive event to direct all forces against the enemy's centre of gravity is significant since:

"If the enemy is thrown off balance, he must not be given time to recover. Blow after blow must be struck in the same direction; the victor, in other words, must strike with all his strength, and not just against a fraction of the enemy's. Not by taking things the easy way - using superior strength to filch some province, preferring the security of the minor conquest to a major success - but by constantly seeking out his centre of power, by daring all to win all, will one really defeat the enemy."[39]

Consequently, this is still very important in the contemporary conduct of warfare since it leads to moral force of the enemy being destroyed as well and, as a result, winning the war physically will become much easier. As Michael Howard[40] shows, Clausewitz should be given credit for leaving a very good legacy since "On War" determines the way Western world had thought and is still thinking of war and it is still of tremendous importance today. Nowadays, his ideas such as the centre of gravity and friction are very important, as they are used in most war studies. Air power theorists, for example, use his centre of gravity in missile technology; like Liddel Hart[41] argues, air power is great because it can go straight and destroy the centre of gravity of a country. After the World War I, the identification, hitting and destruction of the centre of gravity became very important and this allowed future wars like the 1991 Gulf War to be won quickly with low casualties on the side of Western allies and high casualties on Saddam's side.

Although the British appeared to have ignored Clausewitz because they saw themselves as the great maritime power, the Germans used his ideas in their warfare. Later, the French also used his ideas although they got him wrong by distorting his message by thinking that moral force always overcomes physical strength or weapon forces. Clausewitz influenced Marx and Engels, as Marxists see war as an extension of class politics by other means. Therefore, Soviets like Lenin, Trotsky and others such as Moltke absorbed Clausewitz theory and even plagiarised parts of his theory. Since Clausewitz covered almost everything that can be said on the nature of war, Colmar Von Der Goltz[42] remarks that:

"A military writer who, after Clausewitz, writes upon war, runs the risk of being likened to the poet who after Goethe, attempts a Faust, or after Shakespeare, a Hamlet. Everything of importance to be said about the nature of war can be found stereotyped in the works left behind by that greatest of military thinkers."[43]

Nevertheless, while looking at his defects, Clausewitz seemed wrong to view that humans will always engage into wars and that war is the best means of settling conflicts; his name became therefore more and more associated with battle and blood. Saying that "the character of battle is slaughter, and its price is blood" gave Clausewitz the reputation of bloodthirstiness and he was criticised for not taking ethical views while arguing that victorious army in the battlefield should pursue the loosing side in order to maximise the losses caused.[44] However, Azar Gat[45] disagrees with this argument since, to him, Clausewitz dealt with the ethical status of war. As Clausewitz focussed much on combat at the expense of preparations for war, Martin Van Graveld[46] criticises his lack of concern for logistics. Post-World War II seems to have made Clausewitz irrelevant because his traditional view that war was based on the 'wonderful trinity' of government, military and people did not hold up after 1945 with the arrival of pre-emptive nuclear strike, Mutually Assured Destruction, potential for conflict in environmental catastrophe and between multi-national companies.[47] For instance, the development Weapons of Mass Destruction[48] has made Clausewitz's suggestion that war was a continuation of politics by other means obsolete, as most countries possessing such weapons are scared of engaging into war against each other. Since the use of nuclear weapons can result in their obliteration as recognised states or, even worse, the destruction of humankind, these countries prefer to settle their conflicts through diplomacy and other peaceful international legal means such as the use of the International Court of Justice.[49]

John Keegan[50] disagrees with Clausewitz's war definition that suffers from myopia because if war could be limited only to the extension of politics, "the world would have been a simpler place to understand."[51] After looking at the Zulus, Mamelukes and Samurai, Mr Keegan[52] stresses that war embraces lots more than simply politics because in many societies war is seen as culture itself since it shapes cultural identities and determines its forms.[53] For example, in Somali clan warfare, people of different clans are fighting not only for political reasons but also historic, religious and cultural reasons. Samuel Huntington[54] rightly remarks that Muslims are engaged in many wars around the world not solely because of political reasons but also because of their culture or religion, as Islam obliges all Muslims to wage holy war against the unbelievers.[55] He adds that there are wars and violent conflicts wherever Islam shares borders with people of different cultures and concluded, "Islam's borders are bloody."[56] As Anton La Guardia[57] illustrates, Muslims Against Global Oppression (MAGO) launched war against the West and they even attempted to kill the British Premier Tony Blair while he was in his South Africa visit due to Desert Fox bombings against Iraq. Nevertheless, this declaration of war by MAGO cannot be considered in the Clausewitzian continuation of politics since it is simply an Islamic religious fanaticism without any political objective. Moreover, in the 1994 Rwandan war, Hutus slaughtered about one million Tutsis not only for political reasons but also because of historic, cultural and racial differences between them. Hence, Kalevi J. Holsti[58] criticises Clausewitzian image of war as an organised combat between military forces of two or more states because most post-1945 wars are intra-states since they are being waged within states, e.g. Somalia, Myanmars, Azerbaijan and Rwanda.[59] Robert L. O'Connell[60] declares that Clausewitz's most famous definition of war as a continuation of politics by other means has been rendered totally irrelevant because most combats have become merely a continuation of revenge and retaliation in today's world.[61] Furthermore, James Adams[62] explains that the next World War has moved out from Clausewitz's theory to the cyberwarfare in "empty battlefields". Therefore, the battle would not involve two armies facing each other, as it will be fought down telephone via satellites using various computer bugs, viruses and worms that will destroy the enemy without a shot being fired.[63]

As Michael I. Handel[64] explains, another Clausewitz's defect comes from the style and methodology used in his book[65] that is too long, unclear and very difficult to understand. The book seems a bit inconsistent because there is an infuriating incoherence in the way key concepts are presented, as they are widely separated throughout the whole book. Therefore, people are advised to read "On War" repeatedly from cover to cover in order to understand it quite correctly. Another defect comes from the fact that Clausewitz did not mention arm races like it is happening in today's world and he forgot also to include Guerrilla warfare among his paradigm. In addition, Clausewitz's forgot the role of maritime power, which he never showed a slightest interest and awareness although he was more interested in military history. Historically, most wars that occurred between major European powers two hundred years ago involved mainly the maritime power; for this reason, Bernard Brodie[66] criticises Clausewitz by remarking that a thinker on war can hardly be considered universal if he does not mention even a line on maritime warfare.   

Moreover, Clausewitz strategy of being very strong in general and at decisive point is criticised because most things such as the commander's skills; troops training and morals do not necessarily depend on leaders' control and sometimes the two fighting forces can match. While Colmar Goltz[67] does not agrees with Clausewitz's defensive primacy since it is incompatible with his ideas of complete destruction of the enemy; for this reason, he advocates that Clausewitz could have changed it if he did not die before finishing the book. Further, his doctrine of centre of gravity looks a bit banal when it comes to its point of brutality because conflict cannot only be solved with war, as there are other bloodless means such as diplomacy and it can be in breach of international law since civilians may be targeted. It may happen also that the supposed centre of gravity does not exist where it is thought to be, as, for instance, Israeli centre of gravity for example can be in Washington DC rather than Tel Aviv or Jerusalem. While other centre of gravity may be hard to identify since until now many UK people do not still know where the IRA's centre of gravity is or like in 1940s, Hitler wanted to defeat Britain but where was the UK's centre of gravity? Clausewitz list of centre of gravity, which he limited only to the opponent army, his capital and the army of his allies, seems to be incomplete and it can be added with the enemy's economic capacity to continue war, which had been among the prime objective in the then wars that were almost continuous between Spain, UK, France and Holland two centuries ago. In today's globalisation era, many multi-national companies have more power than nation states and since these big companies are providing jobs for the people, future wars could be fought not between states but between such companies.[68]

Clausewitz failed to foresee another centre of gravity that may reside with the role industrial societies could play in war since many states could loose war if their main industries that are at the heart of state economic machinery are destroyed. It can be added that the nerve system of the decision making body can also constitute the centre of gravity. However, with the arrival of nuclear weapons, Clausewitz's identification of opponent army, as a real centre of gravity is rendered a bit redundant. Moreover, since Clausewitz said nothing on the impact of industrialisation and the development of technology would have in the conduct of warfare, Hugh Smith[69] questions whether his war theories are still relevant in contemporary warfare. Clausewitz forgot to mention the role women could play in War; since, as Kate Muir[70] opines, the future army is, largely than before, going to be female. Since women now train for combat and they have joined most ranks in the military ranging from pilots, artilleries and foot soldiers, Clausewitz's historical paternalistic views has turned on its head. The US and UK women soldiers who fought and died alongside men in the 1991 have illustrated that Clausewitz did wrong to forget women who can be as good soldiers as men. While forgetting the role of women, Clausewitz did not foresee as well that the recent introduction of women in front lines of battlefield could have changed many things in war since most countries still avoid their women being captured, raped or being victims of other atrocities. Further, in today's revolution in military affairs and intelligence that is involving the application of technology, intelligence, computers, reconnaissance that provide command and control women will play a major role since they are more skilful in Information and Technology.

In conclusion, Clausewitz is a great thinker in war and conflict studies and his superiority lies in the intelligent way in which he planned methods to formulate and clarify his war concepts. As his definition of war and other theories, i.e. the centre of gravity and friction show, Clausewitz really contributed a lot in war and conflicts studies since these are still being used by military planners and in war studies. Even with the arrival of nuclear weapons, Clausewitz is still very important since both nuclear strategists and disarmers do need to consider in one way or another his theories on means and ends, friction, centre of gravity and the relationship between military objectives and political aims. However, although war can also be the result of culture and there are no mention on the role of women, maritime power, arms race etc. in "On War", it should be noted that Clausewitz died before completing his book and the revision he promised did not materialise. Therefore, Clausewitz was right to warn that if he dies before completing his work, he would leave behind him "a shapeless mass of ideas" that will endlessly be misinterpreted and "made the target of much half backed criticism." Secondly, Clausewitz knew that his war theory was debatable by asserting "that every case in war must be considered and thought through in its own right" and this recognition gave him an everlasting respect as a great thinker on war.[71] Finally, since everyone is fallible and can have weaknesses, it seems right to say that Clausewitz ones are not the one that could stop his credible contribution in war and conflicts studies. In brief, Clausewitz is truly one of the most important masters and makers of modern strategy in contemporary war and conflict studies.

Bibliography

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Howard, M.  Clausewitz: Past Masters, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1983.

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Reynolds, C.  Clausewitz & Strategic Theory, British Journal of International Studies, vol. 4, 1978, pp. 178-196.

Earle, E. (ed.) Makers of Modern Strategy (Chap. On Clausewitz).

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This work (essay/article) was written by:

Mr Jean-Paul LAWRENCE TAMPU-EYA, PhD (Res.), BA(Hon's), LL.B.(Hon's), LL.M. (London) 

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[1] E. Earle (ed.), "Makers of Modern Strategy" (Chap. on Clausewitz). See also M.I. Handel, "Masters of War", 1994.

[2] James Adams, "The Next World War: The Warriors and Weapons of the New Battlefields in Cyberspace", Hutchinson, London, 1998, pp. 93-97.

[3] Clausewitz, "On War", (ed.) P. Paret & Howard. See articles by P. Paret, Howard & B. Brodie. Chap. 1, 6, 7 (Book I) 2(Book II) 3(Book III) & 6(Book VII).

[4] Ditto.

[5] Ditto. p. 28.

[6] In his historic-sociologic explanation of war, Clausewitz says that all wars are the product of the way society fight and they are based on what shape society at the time of war. For instance, there was limited in 18^th century because society was shaped on that way. After the French revolution, all this changed since French people came out from being the King's subjects to citizens. The culture circumstances determine whether war could be limited or total. In addition, Clausewitz takes Plato's idea that there are ideal and reality while looking at the psychological explanation of war. The ideal involves total war, which in reality is a philosophical idea that is simply the abstract of the ideals, as there could never be a total war. Although sometimes war approaches to become total, Clausewitz sees it as simply untrue because there are usually no actions going on in 90 per cent of the times in all wars. An empirical view is that in most wartime, there are no actions and war is faded away with inactivity. This idea of not having a total war came to be seen as a reality in 1944 with the arrival of nuclear weapons, which, therefore, made Clausewitz in theory and practise to become a reality. For a war to be a real one, it has to be rational, reasoned and an extension of politics since if this is not the case it is meaningless violence.

[7] Raymond Aron, "Clausewitz: Philosopher of War", Routledge & Keegan Paul, London, 1976, pp. 353-356.

[8] Anton La Guardia, "Rebel Forces Enter Sierra Leone Capital", The Daily Telegraph, Thursday January 7^th 1998, p. 21.

[9] Anatol Rapoport (ed.), "Clausewitz: On War", Penguin Books, Pelican Classics, 1968, p. 101-122.

[10] Ditto. p. 119.

[11] Clausewitz, "On War", (ed.) P. Paret & Howard. See articles by P. Paret, Howard & B. Brodie. Chap. 1, 6, 7 (Book I) 2(Book II) 3(Book III) & 6(Book VII), p. 69.

[12] Kalvi J. Holsti, "Peace and War: Armed Conflicts and International Order 1648-1989", Cambridge University Press, 1991.

[13] Ditto. p. 13.

[14] See all UN Security Council Resolutions 660, 661, 687 and others passed during and after the 1990-1 Gulf War conflict in accordance with Chapter VII of the 1945 UN Charter.

[15] Patrick Cockburn et al., "2am: Heaviest bombing of Iraq so Far...", The Independent, Friday 18^th December 1998, pp. 1, 2-7.

[16] Ditto.

[17] Samuel B. Payne, Jr., "The Conduct of War: An Introduction to Modern Warfare", Basil Blackwell, UK, 1989.

[18] Ditto. pp. 29-30.

[19] Samuel B. Payne, Jr. ibid. p. 29.

[20] See Samuel B. Payne, Jr., ibid. p. 29-30. Italics added.

[21] Michael Howard and P. Paret, eds., "On War", Princeton, 1976, pp. 518, 508.

[22] Carl Von Clausewitz, "On War" (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University press, 1987), p. 357.

[23] Clausewitz, "On War", (ed.) P. Paret & Howard. See articles by P. Paret, Howard & B. Brodie. Chap. 1, 6, 7 (Book I) 2(Book II) 3(Book III) & 6(Book VII), p. 177.

[24] Ditto. p. 204.

[25] Lawrence Freedman, "WAR", Oxford Readers, Oxford University Press, 1994.

[26] Ditto. pp. 207-212.

[27] Anatol Rapoport (ed.), "Clausewitz: On War", Ibid. p. 164-167.

[28] Anatol Rapoport (ed.), "Clausewitz: On War", p. 165.

[29] Ditto. p. 164.

[30] Ditto. p. 33-34.

[31] Ditto.

[32] Ditto. p. 167.

[33] Ditto.

[34] Raymond Aron, "Clausewitz: Philosopher of War", Routledge & Keegan Paul, London, 1976, p. 117.

[35] John Strawson, "Churchill and Hitler: In Victory and Defeat", Constable and Company Ltd., London, 1997, pp. 233-300, at p. 234.

[36] John Strawson, ibid. See footnotes on p. 234.

[37] Carl Von Clausewitz, "On War", ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret, Princeton University Press, 1976, p. 595.

[38] Ditto. p. 596.

[39] Ditto. p. 596.

[40] Michael Howard, "Clausewitz: Past Masters", Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1983, pp. 59-73.

[41] Liddell Hart, "The Future of War", Paris, 1925.

[42] Colmar Von Der Goltz, "The Nation in Arms" (London, 1913).

[43] Ditto. p. 1.

[44] Hugh Smith, "The Womb of War: Clausewitz and International Politics", Review of International Studies, 1990, 16, pp. 39-58, at p. 56.

[45] Azar Gat, "Clausewitz's Political and Ethical World View", Tel Aviv University, Political Studies (1989), XXXVII, pp. 97-106.

[46] Matin Van Graveld, "Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton" (Cambridge, 1977), pp. 68-71; Michael Howard, "Clausewitz", ibid. pp. 101-103.

[47] James Adams, ibid. p. 94.

[48] Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) include nuclear and biological weapons.

[49] Rosalyn Higgins, "PROBLEMS & PROCESS: International Law and How We Use It", Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1994, p. 186-204, at p. 189.

[50] John Keegan, "A History of Warfare", Pimlico, Random House, UK, 1993.

[51] John Keegan, ibid. p. 3.

[52] Ditto. p. 24-46.

[53] John Keegan, ibid. p. 12.

[54] Samuel Huntington, "The Clash of Civilisations and the Remaking of World Order, Touchstone, UK, 1996.

[55] See also John Keegan, ibid. p. 389.

[56] S. Huntington, ibid. p. 258.

[57] Anton La Guardia & Robert Shrimshley, "Police Use Stun Guns on Muslim Anti-Blair Protesters", The Daily Telegraph, January 8^th 1999, p. 16.

[58] Kalevi J. Holsti, "The State, War, and the State of War", Cambridge Studies in International Relations, Cambridge University Press, 1996.

[59] Ditto. p. 14.

[60] Robert L. O'Connell, "Ride of the Second Horseman: Britain and the Death of War", University of Oxford Press, Oxford, UK, 1995, p. 108.

[61] Ditto.

[62] Ditto. p. 97.

[63] Ditto.

[64] Michael I. Handel, Masters of War: Sun Tzu, Clausewitz and Jomini", Frank Class, 1992, p. 24-38.

[65] This book has over 600 pages.

[66] Brodie in Clausewitz, "On War", p. 48.

[67] Colmar von der Goltz, "The Nation in Arms", 1883.

[68] James Adams, ibid. p. 94.

[69] Hugh Smith, ibid. pp. 38-40.

[70] Kate Muir, "Arms and the Woman", Sinclair-Stevenson, London, 1992.

[71] Clausewitz, Von Kriege, 5^th Edition, (Berlin, 1905), p. iii-vi.